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ABSTRACT
Identity and Access Management (IAM) is in the core of any information systems.
Traditional IAM systems manage users, applications, and devices within organizational
boundaries, and utilize static intelligence for authentication and access control. Identity
federation has helped a lot to deal with boundary limitation, but still limited to static intelligence
– users, applications and devices must be under known boundaries. However, today’s IAM
requirements are much more complex. Boundaries between enterprise and consumer space, on
premises and cloud, personal devices and organization owned devices, and home, work and
public places are fading away. These challenges get more complicated for Internet of Things
(IoTs) due to their diverse use and portability nature. IoTs are being used in consumer space,
healthcare, manufacturing, retails, entertainment, transportation, public sector, and many other
places. Identity Relationship Management (IRM) can help in solving some of these challenges
as it uses a more natural way of access management - a relationship-based access control
methodology. IRM can perform identity and relationship management beyond home and
organizational boundaries and can simplify authorization and authentication using dynamic
intelligence based on relationship.
In this research, we studied the needs of IRM for the Internet of Things. We explored
four fundamental questions in IRM: what relationships need to be supported in IRM, how
relationships can be supported in IRM, how relationship can be used for access control, and
finally what infrastructure is required to support IRM. Since relationship is globally spread out
and perimeter-less in nature, we designed the IRM service with a global scalable, modular, and
borderless architecture. Instead of building something from scratch, we slightly modified the
UMA 2.0 protocol built on top of OAuth 2.0 to make the relationship-based access control
feature easily pluggable with existing IAM frameworks. We implemented a proof-of-concept
to demonstrate and analyze the results of this research. This dissertation serves as the foundation
for future research and development in IRM domain.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Identity and Access Management (IAM) is the security discipline of identifying users
and controlling their access to resources through the processes of provisioning, authentication,
authorization, delegation, revocation, expiration and deprovisioning. IAM is used everywhere
- home, work, healthcare, public sector, entertainment, telecommunication, transportation,
wherever a user needs to interact with an application or a device. This chapter discusses the
need of a refined access control methodology for IoT devices, introduces the concept of Identity
Relationship Management, and finally defines the objectives of this research.

1.1 Problem Statement
Due to the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoTs) everywhere, IAM in IoT has been
a key focus of research and engineering in past few years. IoT typically refers to small scale or
embedded computing devices that have minimal or no user interfaces and are connected to the
Internet. These devices need to be accessed and controlled remotely by users, administrators,
and other devices. Many security issues and challenges have been reported to enable this
requirement (Bhattarai, et al., 2008).
IAM is in the core of security and coming up with an effective IAM solution designed
and developed for IoT use cases is the first step. The emerging IoT also raises new requirements
for identity and access management. IAM needs are becoming more consumer oriented and
dynamic. There are four changes in identity and access management in the IoT:
1) Change of entities: Traditional IAM systems focus on managing identities of users.
IoTs require extending identity management to include devices. Identities of Things
(IDoT), a general term describing the entities such as users and devices in the IoT,
has been well adopted.
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2) Change of perimeter: Traditional IAM systems focus on meeting demands within
organizations and their partners. However, the users of IoTs or IoT devices may not
be bound to organizational boundaries, and therefore IoTs require IAM to be
perimeter-less. This is the biggest difference in access management for IoTs, which
requires IAM frameworks to evaluate access privileges for entities that are not
managed by them and yet the frameworks are responsible for granting those
unknown entities access to the protected data.
3) Change of scale: Traditional IAM systems deal with one or more organizations, but
to achieve a perimeter-less quality, an IAM framework needs to operate in Internet
scale.
4) Change of intelligence: Traditional IAM systems manage a known set of users and
devices, which are part of an organization or partner organizations. However, due
to having a loosely coupled user base and due to the portable nature of IoTs, an IAM
system for IoTs need to deal with dynamic user base and devices, and thus will
require dynamic intelligence to identify users, devices and their relationship with
each other.
Unfortunately, there is no well-defined and established standard for identity and access
management in IoT. Different manufacturers have come up their own solutions to identify,
provision, authenticate, authorize their devices, and manage relationships among devices,
services and users. As a result, IoT systems from different manufacturers are not able to
communicate with each other, and thus are not able to take advantage of capabilities already
available in other devices. This results in duplication of the same set of capabilities in multiple
IoT systems. For example, a smart thermostat and a security system both need a motion sensor
to detect occupancy in a home. Unless they are from the same manufacturer, or sometime
despite being from the same manufacturer, they must use their own motion sensors.
Many limitations of the traditional IAM systems are expected to be resolved by adopting
Identity Relationship Management (IRM). IRM manages identities of users and devices as well
as the relationships among these entities. IAM systems can use these relationships to control
access to the IoT devices (Friese, 2014). Relationship, in fact, is the foundation of any access
control mechanisms; it is the relationship that drives the access control decisions – employer-
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employee,

computer-user,

bank-customer,

husband-wife,

doctor-patient,

car-driver,

application-user and so on. These relationships are still either translated by human visually, or
by issuing a token (e.g., a username/password, key, certificate, marriage certificate, birth
certificate, passport, driving license, etc.) as a proof of the relationship, and then access control
decisions are made based on the visual translations or the tokens. This research introduces and
discusses the needs of IRM in the IoT, addresses the fundamental design challenges for building
an IRM system, and finally provides future directions for IRM.

1.2 Research Objective & Research Questions
The purpose of this research is to build a borderless Identity Relationship Management
framework for the Internet of Things that will simplify identification of users, devices and
resources involved in the IoT ecosystem, streamline access management by replacing static
resource-based policies with dynamic relationship-based policies, and finally facilitate
interoperability in IoT devices from different manufacturers by providing a globally
standardized framework. The four research questions pertaining to this research are stated
below:
1) How do we define and characterize relationships?
2) How do relationships help with access control?
3) What infrastructure support an information system should have to support IRM?
4) How do we evaluate the effectiveness of the artifact?
The first research question attempts to identify the entities involved in the IRM
framework and relationships among those entities. Since the relationship between an IoT device
and the person who owns the device can qualify that person to manage the device, or the
relationship between the owner of the device and a person living in the same household can
qualify that person to access the IoT device to certain capacity, identifying the entities and their
relationships is the foundation of this research.
The next research question seeks answers to how these relationships can be used for
identity and access management in IoT domain. Relationship in an IRM framework is the key
driving factor in determining who will be able to access an IoT device to what capacity, if an
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IoT device will have access to another IoT device, or an IoT device will be allowed in a
corporate network. In traditional IAM frameworks, the relationship factor is not present. As a
result, all the accesses need to be manually granted and managed – there are no policies to
automate that. For example, if hundred employees bring two personal IoT devices to use for the
same purpose, IAM will require manually onboarding all those devices and granting access to
necessary resources individually. Relationship can simplify the access management by defining
a policy that automatically grants those accesses just because the IRM system knows the
relationship between the employees and the IoT devices.
The third research question studies the architecture and infrastructure aspect for
developing a borderless Identity Relationship Management framework. This question is very
important for this research. How do we build an IRM framework on a global scale? What kind
of hardware and software support will be needed to support IRM infrastructure? Which
organization will be responsible for maintaining and supporting such an infrastructure? All
these questions will be considered here.
The fourth research question is to evaluate the effectiveness of the borderless IRM
framework, the artifact designed and developed by this research. This includes identifying the
evaluation metrics for this research as well as the evaluation of the artifact against existing
similar solutions.

1.3 Dissertation Outline
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 perform a literate review
of different IAM methodologies, their evolution, IAM technologies available for IoT domain,
Identity Relationship Management, and current knowledge of IRM in IoT. Chapter 3 discusses
the research methodology used by this research. Chapter 4 identifies the characteristics of
relationship in IoT space and outlines the relationship design for IRM. Chapter 5 explores how
relationship can be used in access-control of IoT devices using IRM, both from authentication
and authorization perspective. Chapter 6 discusses the architecture design of the IRM system.
Chapter 7 evaluates the outcome of the IRM framework from the artifact designed as part of
this research. It also performs a few case studies to understand the results and the effectiveness
of the framework. Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the dissertation.
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1.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed why traditional IAM technologies are not the best for managing
access of IoT devices due to their boundary limitation and static knowledge about users and
devices. We also introduced the concept of Identity Relationship Management, and finally
defined the objectives of this research to apply IRM in IoT space.

6

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter discusses different IAM methodologies, their evolution, IAM technologies
available for IoT domain, Identity Relationship Management, and current knowledge of IRM
in IoT.

2.1 Evolution of IAM Frameworks
Identity and Access Management is the security discipline of identifying users in an
enterprise network and controlling their access to resources, applications, and services through
processes such as provisioning/deprovisioning, authentication, authorization and delegation.
IAM is essential and a core of any information system in enterprise networks. The development
of IAM originally started from enterprise use cases based on the need to manage users’ access
to corporate resources such as computers, applications, services, and facilities. Figure 1 shows
the evolution of IAM technologies from 1980s.

Figure 1. Evolution of IAM Technologies
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Initially IAM architecture was based on an isolated model where service provider also
worked as an identity provider. In the isolated model, a unique identity is issued to a user from
each service provider. With the increasing adaption of digitalization, isolated IDM architecture
fell short and a centralized model evolved. Microsoft Active Directory (AD) is an example of
this model where all the systems in the corporation are connected to the AD. This helps the
enterprise to maintain only a single username and password for each user accessing all the
service providers in the company. It also adds convenience and improves security (Da, 2018).
Federated IDM architecture came next. In the federated model, service providers come up with
an arrangement for exchanging authentication and authorization data by delegating
authentication to an identity provider. Federated IAM, e.g., SAML, simplifies identity
management to a great extent. Features like Single Sign-On (SSO) add convenience to users
and improve security (Chen, 2015).
Federated IAM has evolved beyond enterprise use cases due to the evolution of the
Internet and mobile devices. Unlike enterprises, in Internet-based applications and services,
there may not be a direct and strong mapping of identities. A user visiting a website and opening
an account may not have trustable information. The perimeter of federation is also not defined.
To help these use cases, OAuth 2.0 was developed as an authorization system to allow users
grant a third-party application limited access to resources owned by the user in a perimeter-less
boundary of the Internet. Soon it was realized that the identity of the user (aka resource owner)
performing the authorization was a crucial component missing in OAuth 2.0. Many use cases
were using OAuth 2.0 as an authentication medium while the protocol did not have the
capability for authentication. To deal with this limitation, the OpenID Connect (OIDC) protocol
was developed to provide an identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0. There were still limitations in
OAuth 2.0. For example, a user (aka resource owner) can only authorize a client application to
access protected resources but cannot authorize another user. The User Managed Access
(UMA) grant was drafted as an extension of OAuth 2.0 to enable party-to-party authorization
and thus to allow one user to grant another user access to resources owned by the former
(Machulak, 2017).
With the increased use of Internet based services, Fast Identity Online (FIDO) protocols
were designed to use a password-less authentication approach and thus to improve user privacy
and security (Ng, 2018). The protocols use public key cryptography where client authenticates
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by proving the possession of the private key. This has also enabled using authentication
capabilities available on an end-user device, without the authentication data leaving the user’s
device. These days many online services leverage the FIDO protocol to take advantage of
biometric authentication capabilities like fingerprint and face recognition on modern mobile
devices.
The Kantara initiative introduced the concept of Identity Relationship Management and
laid out the pillars for the shift from IAM to IRM. The business pillars driving the shift include:
1) consumer and things over employees, 2) adaptable over predictable, 3) top line revenue over
operating expense, and 4) velocity over process, and the technical pillars driving the shift
include 1) Internet-scale over enterprise-scale, 2) dynamic intelligence over static intelligence,
3) borderless over perimeter, and 4) modular over monolithic (Maerz, 2013). However, the
initiative does not provide enough details on how this can be applied in real world.

2.2 IAM Framework for IoT
The identity management lifecycle for IoT devices include discovery, provisioning,
management and de-provisioning. During the onboarding phase, an IoT device typically needs
to be bound with one or more users, typically through user’s smart phone or computer; an
authentication scheme is applied, and roles and relationships are captured during this binding
process; and finally, an authorization process is established to allow users, applications or other
devices to access the device throughout its lifecycle.
The isolated IDM model, as discussed earlier, is the most common way of managing
identities in current IoT world. Device manufacturers develop their own ways of identifying
and managing identities of their devices. An IRM system can be more suitable for the IoT than
the traditional IAM systems because IRM focuses on consumers and things over employees,
Internet-scale over enterprise-scale and borderless over perimeter (Maler, et al., 2019). IRM
can link people and things all together and can enable a dynamic context-based strategy.
There are many factors to be considered when designing an identity and access
management model for the IoT. The following section discusses some major factors.
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2.3 Authentication
To address the authentication of IoT devices, the CoAP protocol has been introduced to
facilitate provisioning of resource constrained IoT devices and to support interoperability
(Cirani & Picone, 2015). The CoAP is a web transfer protocol that is primarily designed for
machine-to-machine (M2M) communication. It maps to HTTP and supports REST architecture
for integration with existing web, however, unlike HTTP, it uses lightweight UDP over IP
instead of TCP, because TCP is a connection-oriented protocol and has high congestion control
features, both of which causes a lot of overhead. CoAP also allows multicast and
discoverability.
There

can

be

use

cases

where

classic

authentication

mechanisms

like

username/password may not directly work for IoT devices. A context-based authentication can
be a possible solution for that (Friese et al., 2014). This approach evaluates the context and
environment of the authentication request. If a deviation is observed from the established
pattern, other factors are checked for additional verification. For example, if a request comes
from an internal network, a token may be sufficient, otherwise some other factors like LTE cell
ID or geo-location can be checked additionally. Also, most IoT devices have some relationship
with a person – owner, administrator, or group; the relationship may also be used for additional
authentication proof.

2.4 Authorization
The OAuth protocol may solve the authorization problems for CoAP protocol; however,
OAuth is CPU intensive for low power IoT devices. A stripped-down version of OAuth protocol
has been proposed by Wu et al. (2017) to perform access control of resource constrained IoT
devices. This research shows the protocol takes a little more memory usage than an OAuth
based authorization protocol but smaller power consumption and more suitable for small scale
IoT environment.
An owner-to-owner and owner-to-any authorization scheme on top of CoAP
(Constrained application protocol) has been proposed by Cirani & Picone (2015) by tracking
the relationship in the server side and using that during authorization process. The framework
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proposes an extended IoT-OAS (IoT OAuth-based Authorization Service) architecture, where
users can log on using any authentication/authorization mechanisms accepted by IoT-OAS, for
example, Open ID, OAuth2, Open ID Connect, to get an access token for interaction with IoTOAS. Any users can request owners to grant access to an IoT device through the IoT-OAS
server, The IoT-OAS server will then send a push notification to the owner. Once the owner
approves, the access token will be updated with the new grants.

2.5 Identity of Devices
Identity can be used to uniquely identify a device within a given domain. Currently there
is no standard way to globally identify an IoT device. For standard computer, a MAC address
identifies the device locally in a network while an IP address locates the device for routing
purposes for a specific period. However, neither of them can provide a global unique identifier.
A cryptographic identity will be an ideal candidate since it will not only uniquely
identify devices, but also will enable devices to prove the possession of the assigned identity
by cryptographical assertion. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based identity can offer such
capabilities (Anantharaman et al., 2016). A device can sign a random challenge using its private
key and other entities can verify that using the device’s public key (aka the certificate). The
primary challenge for this approach is the availability of a global scale PKI infrastructure. All
the necessary protocols and standards to build a global PKI exist - the global standardization
bodies need to put them together and have an organization own and provide the service in a
similar way DNS is managed (Martin, 2002).
Anantharaman et al. (2016) proposes macaroon credential as an alternative and
improved solution over straight PKI based identity solutions. Macaroon provides a bearer token
and public key certificate for authorization and delegation in web, mobile devices, and
distributed cloud systems in a decentralized manner. Macaroon contains a public part,
constructed from a random nonce and assertions called caveats, and a private part, constructed
from the HMAC of a symmetric key on the public part. Bearer of a macaroon can delegate parts
of their authority or a portion of it to other entity by deriving new macaroons with a partial set
of caveats. An entity containing public part M1 and private part K1 can generate a new
macaroon {M1, K2} – thus macaroons can be chained together. An entity which knows the
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secret key at the root of a macaroon chain can derive the private parts of all the macaroons along
the chain (Birgisson et al., 2014). While macaroons add the capability of embedded
authorization and delegation of authorization, it comes with the similar challenges observed in
any PKI based solutions, for example, revocation, expiration, renewal, etc.
Blockchain based identity for IoT has been another area. Zhu et al. (2017) proposes a
Blockchain-based Identity Framework for IoT (BIFIT) to self-manage identities by end users.
In this user-centric approach, all identities of owners are maintained in a blockchain while
identities of things are associated with the owners via the signature signed by owners’ private
key. Subject identifier, public keys and signatures are used to construct the identity proof, which
is sent to the blockchain peer-to-peer network and permanently added to the blockchain as a
block.

2.6 Relationships in IoT
There are different entities involved in IAM ecosystem for IoT. While they may vary
based on the functional category, environment and use cases, the major and common example
of entities include device, gateway, user, identity provider and client. The device refers to the
IoT device itself. The device may or may not be IP enabled – devices without direct Internet
connectivity (typically primitive sensors) are connected to a gateway. The gateway refers to a
service or a hub that has Internet connectivity. IoT devices that are not capable of directly
connecting to the Internet can connect through the gateway. The user refers to an owner, an
administrator or simply a user of the IoT devices. The Identity Provider refers to a service
located in cloud providing identity and access management services to IoT devices and users
associated with that. The client refers to an application that allows users to interact with IoT
devices, gateways, or cloud service.
Based on the entities discussed above, an IAM framework for IoT devices need to
consider many types of relationships, for example, relationships between devices and humans,
relationships between homogeneous and heterogeneous devices, and relationships between
devices and gateways/applications. Handling this diverse set of relationships poses different
security challenges – how to identify, how to build and maintain relationship, how to control
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level of access, how to build the interface for interacting among these entities with each other,
etc.
Today the boundaries between work and home have reduced. Users are bringing
personal IoT and BYOD devices to work, accessing resources through them. With the
increasing use cases for IoT devices, the current IAM frameworks will soon fail to meet the
demand and will have difficulty in managing identities and access per user and per device. A
relationship between users, between users and devices, and between devices will simplify the
policy and identity management.

2.7 Identity Relationship Management in IoT
In many cases Identity Relationship Management (IRM) can be more suitable for IoT
than traditional Identity and Access Management (IAM), since IRM has a focus on consumers
and things over employees, Internet-scale over Enterprise-scale, and borderless over perimeter
(Mordeno & Russell, 2017). IRM can link people, places and things and enable a dynamic
context-based strategy that can be applied throughout the user, customer, or employee life cycle.
The Kantara initiative has defined some business and technical pillars for designing an
effective IRM framework: consumer and things over employees, adaptable over predictable,
top line revenue over operating expense, velocity over process, Internet scale over enterprise
scale, dynamic intelligence over static intelligence, borderless over perimeter and modular over
monolithic (Maerz, 2013). Traditional IAM frameworks only manage employees’ access to
authorized on-premises and cloud resources from preapproved computers. However, today’s
users are not limited in using computers only, they use smart phones, tablets, smart watches,
fitness tracker, smart vehicles and many other things that are connected to Internet. Therefore,
modern IAM systems need to focus on consumer and things over employees in order to be able
to provision and manage variety of IoT devices quickly. The system needs to be adaptive to the
context, with dynamic intelligence it should allow users to access resources from any devices
from any locations. There is no corporate perimeter - users can be anywhere on the Internet,
they can be employees, partners and customers, data can be located on-premise, in cloud, or in
partners’ premise. IAM systems should be fast to deploy and adapt, should not require a lot of
processes and configurations to put into operation or to support federation.
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Wilson et al. (2017) proposed IdM elements to be segmented into multiple identity
layers, building an identity stack consisting of relationship, identities, attributes, authentication
data, authentication metadata and deeper network layers, similar to the way OSI network stack
organized. At the top of the stack is the relationships among users, devices, and service
providers. Next comes identities of IoT devices, which are the base of relationships. Attributes
can help in identification, can provide information about the capabilities of the devices, for
example, to match services to users. Authentication data containing attributes and identities is
exchanged between clients (users and devices) and servers (gateways or authentication
providers). Authentication metadata contains quality data about the data, for example, data
about the request, expiry date, source of attributes and authentication data, etc. Finally, the
deeper network layers transport the identity stack.

2.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a literature review of existing IAM methodologies, their
evolution with the development of new technologies, IAM methods available for IoT domain,
Identity Relationship Management, and application of IRM in IoT. The IAM frameworks for
IoTs are still evolving - device manufacturers mostly develop their own ways of identifying and
managing identities of their devices. IRM framework can be more suitable for IoT devices,
because IRM has a focus on consumers and things over employees, Internet-scale over
enterprise-scale, borderless over perimeter. It is more appropriate for end user or consumer use
cases where the user is not a direct member of the enterprise.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The goal of this research is to build a borderless IRM framework for IoTs. We have
adopted a design science research methodology in this research.

3.1 Design Science Research
A design science research (DSR) is an information technology research methodology
that produces a theory, an artifact and impact analysis based on the result produced by the
artifact (Baskerville et al., 2018). The methods used in this research is literature review, study
relationship in IoT ecosystem, and evaluate the impact of applying Identity Relationship
Management in IoT for access management by designing and developing a borderless IRM
system. Thus, this research has followed the design science research methodology. This
research has the all the DSR phases as shown in Figure 2 – identification of the problem,
defining objective and scope of the research, system design, development of the proof of
concept, collection of data, analysis, and validation.

Figure 2. Design Science Research Methodology (Peffers et al., 2007)
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3.2 Identify Problem & Motivate
Traditional IAM technologies are limited in managing access control for known set of
users and resources within a pre-defined boundary of an organization and its partners. However,
due to having a dynamic user base and the portable nature of IoTs, an IAM system for IoTs
needs to have capabilities to deal with unknown set of users and devices in a dynamic way.
Chapters 1 and 2 have identified these problems and thoroughly surveyed different available
IAM frameworks for a solution in the IoT space.

3.3 Defining Objective of a Solution
Identity Relationship Management framework can provide intelligence about users,
devices and their relationships with each other, and facilitate in relationship-based access
control, which can help in solving problems with boundary and unknown userbase of traditional
IAM systems. Chapter 1, section 1.1, titled as “Research Objective & Research Questions”, has
defined the objectives for building an IRM based solution to manage access to resources in IoT
space.

3.4 Design & Development
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have demonstrated a high-level design of this proposed system with
a careful evaluation of all the criteria. In this process, all the entities involved in the IoT
ecosystem and the relationship among them have been identified first. Second, a thorough
assessment has been performed to find the entities and relationships that are relevant and
required in relationship-based access control using the IRM framework. Third, the relationships
have been analyzed to identify their characteristics to be used for access control. Fourth, an
access control framework for IoTs has been designed using IRM; the primary focus of this
design phase was to eliminate the limitations of traditional IAM frameworks. Thus, borderless
and modular characteristics have been the key considerations when designing and developing
the relationship-based framework. Fifth, to keep the solution modular and borderless, the
global-scale IRM system has been designed such a way that any IAM service can plug in with
the IRM service to get intelligence about relationships between a requestor and an IoT device
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and take access control decisions using that knowledge. The UMA 2.0 grant, with slight
modification in the authorization process, has been used for the connecting IRM service to the
IAM services. IAM services has the authority and independence for taking the ultimate access
control decision, to maximize security.

3.5 Demonstration
A proof of concept (POC) has been developed in Java for demonstrating the
relationship-based access control methodology using the IRM framework. A small scale IRM
service and a demo IAM service have been developed to illustrate the relationship registration,
relationships calculation and access control decision making processes. Chapter 5 and 6 provide
the detail of the artifact and demonstrate how IRM can provide a relationship-based access
control in a perimeter-less manner.

3.6 Evaluation
The evaluation of the IRM framework for IoT has been performed in three ways:
building a Proof of Concept (POC), performing use case studies and comparing IRM with
traditional IAM technologies.

3.6.1 Proof of Concept (POC)
The goal of building the IRM POC is to build a platform where we can validate the
design decisions of the proposed IRM framework, verify that relationship-based access control
can be designed in real world, and finally prove that IRM can help with the challenges observed
in traditional IAM technologies.

3.6.2 Use Case Studies
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of IRM framework in solving access control
challenges observed in IoT space, an example use case of a smart wearable medical IoT device
has been executed and studied through the POC platform. In this case study, the owner (of the
device) carries the device all the time; the owner visits a hospital while travelling away from
home; the hospital is able to access the owner’s contact and insurance info from that device and
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the doctors in the hospital are able to access the health history, vitals and current medication
list from that device without any lengthy manual onboarding or validation processes. The goal
of these use case studies is to show that IRM can help with instantaneous access to IoT devices
to users that the IoT device does not have any knowledge about and who are not from a predefined organizational boundary. The dynamic intelligence and borderless capabilities in IRM
are the key to the instantaneous access grant and thus the enablement of these capabilities is
critical for the success of this research. The use case studies also establish the importance
certification authorities in the IRM framework and discuss some challenges in policy
evaluation.

3.6.3 Comparison with Traditional IAM Technologies
The comparisons of the IRM framework with traditional IAM technologies have been
performed to show that these IAM technologies cannot solve the access control challenges in
IoT space in a practical and feasible way as IRM service, and that is due to the absence of
borderless and dynamic intelligence capabilities in these technologies.

3.7 Communication
We have published a paper and presented the paper in the 39th IEEE International
Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE) on Jan 10-12, 2021. The title of the paper is “An
Overview of Identity Relationship Management in the Internet of Things” (Nur & Wang, 2021).

3.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have discussed what is design science research, how we have
followed this methodology in our research. A design science research methodology produces a
theory, an artifact and impact analysis based on the result produced by the artifact. The methods
used in our research is literature review, study relationship in IoT ecosystem, and evaluate the
impact of applying Identity Relationship Management in IoT for access management by
designing and developing a borderless IRM system. Thus, this research has followed the design
science research methodology. We have followed all the phases of the design science research
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in our work - identification of the problem, defining objective and scope of the research, system
design, development of the proof of concept, collection of data, analysis and validation.
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CHAPTER 4
RELATIONSHIP IN IRM FOR IOT
Relationship is in the core of the IRM system. A relationship refers to the affiliation
between two entities in IRM. This chapter identifies the characteristics of relationship in IoT
and outlines the relationship design for IRM.

4.1 Entities in IRM
There are many entities involved in the IoT lifecycle and ecosystem. To identify the
characteristics of relationships, the very first step is to identify the entities in an IRM system.
Figure 3 shows the entities identified in an IoT ecosystem. These entities are described briefly
in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 3. Entities in IRM Ecosystem for IoT
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4.1.1 Organizations
An organization entity (EO) is an entity that groups together a set of users, devices,
applications and services for a common logical purpose. It is very important not to confuse the
concept of an organization in IoT ecosystem with a corporation. An organization in the IoT
ecosystem can be any collective unit, for example, a home, a company, a city, a hospital, a mall,
a toll gate, etc., where an explicit or embedded IAM system is available to control access to
resources via policies.

4.1.2 Users
A user entity (EU) is an individual who directly interacts with the IRM service and is a
consumer of some functionalities offered by an IoT device, for example, an owner of an IoT
device, family members, employees, doctors, citizens of a city, etc.

4.1.3 IoT Devices
An IoT device (ED) refers to a device owned by a user or an organization. It has Internet
connectivity and can be used to carry out certain functionalities. An IoT device can be directly
connected to the Internet, therefore it will be self-contained from hardware and software
capability wise to connect to the Internet. Sometimes a collection of devices, for example,
sensors of a security system, can be connected to the Internet via an IoT hub. In this case, the
hub will have the hardware and software capability to connect to the Internet. The IoT hub is
considered as an IoT entity for this research since this is the device that has internet connectivity
and representative of the sensors in the collection.

4.1.4 IAM Services
An IAM service (EIAM) is a software module that controls access to resources. This can
be an IAM service in a large organization that controls access to thousands of resources or can
be a mini IAM module built and embedded in to a single IoT device for controlling access to
the capabilities provided by the device. The IAM service has a policy engine that contains the
policies for access control and can make access control decisions based on relationship. The
service can be registered with the IRM service to take relationship information as an input to
make an access control decision based on the defined policies.
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4.1.5 IRM Service
The IRM service (EIRM) is the distributed software component that captures and stores
relationships among entities, manages the relationship lifecycle of the entities and relationships
inside it, and finally provides the relationship information between two entities to authorized
IAM services for relationship-based access control.

4.1.6 Applications and Services
An application or service (EAS) is a software program designed to perform certain
functions for authorized users. Applications and services are connected to IAM services for
controlling users, devices or other applications and services accessing to them based on
relationships.
In summary, the entity set can be expressed as below:
E = {EU, EO, ED, EIRM, EIAM, EAS} ……………………………………… (1)

4.2 Relationships in IRM
These entities in IRM system are related to each other in many ways, e.g., relationships
through social bonding, employment, ownership, service provider, service consumer, etc.
RXY = ƒ (EX, EY), where RXY is the relationship between entity EX and EY
In theory, it is possible to have some relationships between any of the two entities in the
entity set E. However, not all these relationships are applicable or important to be captured for
identity relationship management. The only relationships important to IRM are the relationships
that can be used in making a relationship-based policy decision for controlling access.

4.2.1 Relationships Cannot Be Used in IRM
The following relationships cannot be used in any relationship-based policy decision
and thus these do not require to be captured in IRM service:
•

The IAM service gets relationship information between two entities from the IRM
service.
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•

Applications and services in an organization use IAM service to control users and
other applications accessing to the capabilities they provide. They are functionalitywise similar to IoT devices.

•

IoT devices can be connected to an IAM service or a small-scale IAM module built
into the devices for controlling who can access to what functionalities they provide.

Some relationships are not direct and need to be calculated dynamically from other
relationships. Thus, even though these can be used for policy decision making in relationshipbased access management, these are not necessary to be captured in IRM service:
•

The relationship between two IoT devices can be calculated if we capture the
relationship between users and organizations, between users and devices and
between organizations and devices, for example, if two devices have the same
owner, we know these devices have a relationship. Capturing this relationship would
be duplication, would require unnecessary effort.

4.2.2 Relationships Can Be Used in IRM
The following relationships can help in making a relationship-based access control
decision:
•

Relationship between two users (EU1 and EU2), e.g., a patient wearing a device and
the physician that has prescribed and is administering the device.
RUU = ƒ (EU1, EU2) ……………………………………………………… (2)

•

Relationship between two organizations (EO1 and EO2), e.g., a hospital and a nursing
home:
ROO = ƒ (EO1, EO2) ……………………………………………………… (3)

•

Relationship between two devices (ED1 and ED2), e.g., two devices working as a
group, both with Internet connectivity, and only one is associated with an owner:
RDD = ƒ (ED1, ED2) ……………………………………………………… (4)

•

Relationship between an organization (EO) and a user (EU), e.g., a company and its
employees or customers.
ROU = ƒ (EO, EU) ………………………………………………………… (5)

•

Relationship between a user (EU) and a device (ED), e.g., a patient and his smart vital
monitor.
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RUD = ƒ (EU, ED) ………………………………………………………… (6)
•

Relationship between an organization (EO) and a device (ED), e.g., a company and a
computer owned by the company.
ROD = ƒ (EO, ED) ………………………………………………………… (7)

To summarize, the relationships among the following three entities are important from
identity relationship management perspective and hence need to be captured in the IRM service:
(a) users, (b) organizations and (c) IoT devices. The relationship set in IRM can be expressed
as below:
R = {RUU, ROO, RDD, ROU, RUD, ROD} ……………………………………… (8)
The entity set for IRM in equation (1) can be revised only to have the entities relevant
to IRM:
E = {EU, EO, ED} …………………………………………………………… (9)
Devices
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Figure 4. Relationships among Entities in IRM
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4.3 Design Considerations for Relationship in IRM
There are some important characteristics of relationship from IRM and IoT perspective
that need to be considered when designing relationship for IRM service. The following
paragraphs discusses those briefly.

4.3.1 Adaptability
There are many kinds of relationships available via social bonding and organizational
membership, for example, family, spouse, children, friend, neighbor, citizen, employee,
contractor, coworker, mentor, doctor, patient, student, teacher and so on. There can be
subcategories and variations among them, for example, employees can be manager, individual
contributor, etc. The relationship largely depends on the need of an organization and its access
control policy needs. Therefore, the IRM service needs to be flexible enough to adopt any kind
of possible relationships demanded by use cases in an organization.

4.3.2 Transient Relationship
Some relationships are transient, for example, a guest accessing an IoT device at home
or an interviewee trying to use a smart elevator or a smart vending machine. These relationships
are temporary, based on the situational context, and can change over time.

4.3.3 Degree of Relationship and Relationship Graph
Some relationships are direct, for example, the wife of a person accessing an IoT device
owned by that person has a direct relationship with the person. Some relationships are indirect,
for example, the brother of that wife trying to access the IoT device has an indirect relationship
with the person. The distance in relationships can be expressed as degree of relationship, for
example, the person has first-degree relationship with the device, his wife has a second-degree
relationship with the device, his wife’s brother has a third-degree relationship with the device
and so on. Figure 5 illustrates the degree of relationship through a relationship graph where
each node or vertex represents an entity, e.g., a user, an organization or a device, and each edge
represents a relationship between the entities or vertices it connects. ED in the graph is the IoT
device that is being accessed to, EO-D is the owner of the device and ER is the requestor that is
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trying to access the device. Each entity has been marked with the distance (aka degree of
relationship) from the device that is being accessed.
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Figure 5. Relationship Graph and Degree of Relationship
We can rewrite equations (2) to (7) with a new parameter, degree of relationship (DR),
which can be used in specifying the degree of relationship acceptable when a relationship-based
access control decision is being made:
RUU = ƒ (EU1, EU2, DR) ………………………………………………………… (10)
ROO = ƒ (EO1, EO2, DR) ………………………………………………………… (11)
RDD = ƒ (ED1, ED2, DR) ………………………………………………………… (12)
ROU = ƒ (EO, EU, DR) …………………………………………………………… (13)
RUD = ƒ (EU, ED, DR) …………………………………………………………… (14)
ROD = ƒ (EO, ED, DR) …………………………………………………………… (15)
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4.3.4 Legal Recognition
Some relationships are legally recognized and certified by social and organizational
authorities, for example, family relationships are certified via marriage certificate or birth
certificate, employment are certified by the employer, etc. On the other side, some relationships
are not structured that way, for example, friend. These relationships are equally important for
IoT use cases.

4.3.5 Level of Trust
The level of trust is tied with the legal recognition of the relationship and integrity of
relationship captured in IRM service, for example, marriage or employee relationships have
higher level of trust due to the legal aspect of these relationships compared to a friend or guest
relationship. However, a marriage relationship in IRM, unless it is validated, may not have the
level of trust needed for strong policy decision.

4.3.6 Certification Authority
To address the legal recognition and level of trust issues, there has to be an attestation
and verification process for integrity and trustworthiness of the relationships. This triggers the
need of another entity in IRM framework – the certification authorities. Certification authorities
are bodies that attest entities and the relationship claimed by two entities. For example, a
certification authority can attest an organization, and the organization can attest the employeremployee relationship with an employee. Figure 6 illustrates the concept of certificate
attestation process. It is up to the IAM service and its policy on how to weigh certified vs
uncertified relationships for policy decision. Digitalization of identities and automation of
identity and document verification process can facilitate in this certification process for IRM.
A PKI model can be used to implement the attestation and validation in the certification process,
exactly the way digital certificate framework works. However, this is out of scope of this
particular research.
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Figure 6. Relationship Registration and Certification

4.4 Relationship Design for IRM
Based on the discussion about entities, relationships and relationship design
characteristics from the earlier sections, Figure 7 captures a simplified model of relationship
data that need to be captured in the IRM. Users, organizations, and devices tables track the
registrations of the corresponding entities with the IRM system. Relationships table tracks
relationships among users, organizations, and devices along with attestation. Certification
Authorities table contains information about the authority that verifies relationship and the
certificates used by the certificate authorities for attestation. Chapter 5 will provide more details
about why the attributes captured in different tables are required and how they contribute in
relationship-based access control.
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Figure 7. Relationship Model in IRM

4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have identified the entities we need to capture relationships for, what
relationships need to be captured and how, in order to use relationships in access control of IoT
devices through IRM framework. We have identified three types of entities that are relevant for
IRM in IoT ecosystem: (a) users, (b) organizations, (c) IoT devices. We also have discussed the
characteristics of relationship in IoT space that are important design considerations for IRM:
adaptability, transient relationship, degree of relationship, legal recognition, level of trust and
certification authorities.
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CHAPTER 5
ACCESS MANAGEMENT FOR IOT USING RELATIONSHIP
Relationship can be used in access control of IoT devices using IRM – from both
authentication and authorization perspective. This chapter provides a detail design of how
access control of IoT devices can be implemented using an Identity Relationship Management
system. The research has made the following assumptions and therefore these are beyond the
scope of this research: IoT devices have the following capabilities:
 Devices can generate their own public-private key pairs.
 Devices can protect their private keys.
 The connections to and from the device are always secured.

5.1 Relationship in Authorization
In IRM system, relationship is the factor that drives access control of resources. In a
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model, accesses are granted using roles. If the policy
indicates that an employee needs manager’s approval to get access to a system, the manager is
the role controlling the access. In an Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) model, accesses
are granted using attributes. If a policy indicates only employees whose “office=Building 40”
can access that building, the attribute “office” is controlling the access to that given building.
Similarly, in a Relationship Based Access Control model (RelBAC), accesses are granted based
on relationships. If the policy indicates if employees of a company can access to a device, it is
the “employer-employee” relationship that is governing the access to the device.
Figure 8 illustrates a borderless IRM-based IAM concept. Jim is married to Pam and
Oliver is their child. Jim owns an IoT device. Due to policy 2 (owner-to-user relationship),
Pam and Oliver also get owner level access to that device. Jim takes his device to work. Due to
policy 2 (owner-to-device relationship), he can access the corporate resource 1 through his
personal IoT device just like corporate IoT device 3. Traditional IAM systems cannot manage
users and devices outside of the organizational scope (in this case, Jim’s home is outside of
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corporate scope) due to the lack of intelligence about relationships, and thus, they would not be
able to grant access to resources in such dynamic approach.
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Figure 8. Access Control using Relationships with IRM
There can be different types of relationships between users which will impact the level
of accesses to an IoT device. For example, a homeowner, the spouse, the child, and guests will
have different level of permissions on a device. The policies in IRM system can also address
the scope of permissions to allow limiting access to resources based on the relationship. For
example, one permission can grant users read access to a device while another can grant write
access to the resource. During the authorization process, different entities will be assigned
different scopes based on the policy definitions.
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5.2 Relationship in Authentication
Authentication is the very first step in any identity and access management system.
There are three primary authentication factors: something you know (e.g., username and
password), something you have (e.g., a physical token or a smartcard), and something you are
(e.g., fingerprint or face recognition). In addition, Context-Based Authentication (CBA), also
known as Risk-Based Authentication or Adaptive Authentication (Steinegger, et al., 2016), has
become very popular these days as a secondary authentication factor. The CBA method builds
behavior profile for each user based on two factors: somewhere you are and something you do.
In this process, the location where the user is logging in from, the hardware and software used
by the user to log in, the time of the day the user logs in, the kind of activities the user performs,
etc. are captured to build the behavioral profile of the user. Later the CBA method uses this
profile to determine if there is a deviation from the norm, and therefore if there is any risk
associated with the transaction. IP address, geo-location, MAC address, OS or browser
information, time zone and timestamp of the transaction are some example CBA factors.
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Figure 9. Authentication using Relationships with IRM
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While relationship does not have the properties of a primary authentication factor, it can
be utilized in Context-Based Authentication. Relationship can help in gaining real-time
intelligence about a user. Figure 9 illustrates a use of relationship in CBA. Jim and Pam, a
married couple and Seattle resident, go to London for vacation and stay at a friend’s place.
While on vacation, Jim attempts to access an IoT device. With the help of the IRM system, the
home IAM module determines that Jim is a friend visiting the owner and grants access to the
IoT device, however, it also triggers a multi-factor authentication (MFA) as defined by a policy.
Shortly after Jim, Pam also attempts to access the IoT device and the home IAM identifies her
as the owner’s friend’s wife and thus eligible to access the IoT device. Since Jim has logged in
shortly before Pam from the same location, Pam’s attempt to access the device is considered as
low risk and she is not asked for second factor authentication. Traditional IAM systems cannot
track relationship and thus, in the example above, will not allow to authentication and second
factor authentication for Pam. However, authentication is not in the scope of this research – the
focus is authorization perspective of access control.

5.3 Design Considerations for Relationship Based Access Control
in IRM
IRM service has some technical and business pillars (Maerz, 2013) that are very
important for the success of IRM. The following paragraphs discuss those pillars.

5.3.1 Borderless
The IRM service for IoT cannot be bound by perimeter of a single or a federation of
organizations, rather it needs to be able to track relationship beyond the boundaries of the
organizations. IRM can offer intelligence about relationships of external devices, users and
organizations with internal devices, users, and organizations, and the IAM system can use this
intelligence to make the access control decision based on the relationship criteria defined in the
policies.
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5.3.2 Global Scale
To achieve the borderless goal, the IRM service needs to be reachable by IAM systems
of any organizations or IoT devices. In addition, people can travel from one place to another
and carry their IoT device with them. Therefore, the IRM service needs to be globally available
and capable of supporting billions of devices, users, and organizations across the world. Users
can be part of multiple organizations, and thus there will be billions and billions of relationships
that IRM system needs to maintain.

5.3.3 Dynamic Intelligence
The purpose of the IRM for IoT is to provide a traditional IAM system intelligence
about a user that the IAM service does not know about but wants to grant that user access to a
device that it controls. The IAM system is not able to identity the user using its static
intelligence, i.e., by looking at the userbase in the organizations it is associated with. The IRM
service need to capture, store, and maintain relationships in a form of a graph, and if a
relationship exists between a requesting user and a device managed by the IAM service, provide
that information from that graph to the IAM system. The IAM system, if the relationship criteria
defined in the policies are met, allows the user access to the device.

5.3.4 Modular
Building a global scale IRM service that replaces existing IAM technologies and
manage all organizations, users and devices is very complicated, if not impossible - a huge
number of use cases will need to be addressed, a lot of features will need to be built from ground
up, and a lot of privacy, security and geopolitical issues will need to be resolved. Therefore, the
IRM service needs to be built in a modular pattern and loosely coupled with existing IAM
systems, with minimum functionality to maintain and provide relationship information, and
distributed across the world in a modular way.

5.3.5 Velocity
The IRM service needs to be able to make an access control decision instantaneously –
it must not wait for processes to be completed. Zero process overhead and no manual
intervention are the keys.
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5.4 Designing Relationship Based Access Control for IRM
The following sections provide details about how the IRM service is designed in this
research.

5.4.1 Relationship Based Policy
For relationship-based access management, the IAM service needs to support relationshipbased policies. Those policies are associated with the IoT devices of interest so that access to
those devices can be controlled by these policies. Table 1 lists the items that need to be captured
in IRM policies for relationship-based access control.
Table 1. Policy Components for IRM
Components

Information in IRM

Resource Identifier

Resource, i.e., the IoT device that is being protected by the
policy.

Relationship Criteria

Relationship criteria that need to be satisfied for granting
access to the device.

Scopes

List of allowed permissions the requestor will have if access is
granted. The term scope is used to name various permissions
associated with a resource.

Blacklist in ACL

The blacklist contains entities whose requests are denied

(Optional)

without further evaluating any relationship-based-criteria.

Whitelist in ACL

The whitelist contains entities whose requests are directly

(Optional)

granted without any relationship-based-criteria evaluation.

Level of Trust

The trustworthiness of the registered relationship.

5.4.2 Registration of IAM Service with IRM Service
Any IAM service that wants to get relationship information from the IRM service needs
to register with the IRM service. Each IAM service will be assigned a unique client identifier
and client secret to authenticate with the IRM service.
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5.4.3 Registration of Entities with IRM Service
According to equation (9) in 4.2.2, the IRM service only needs to track relationships
about the following entities: users, organizations, and devices.
E = {EU, EO, ED}
These entities need to be registered with the IRM service before capturing relationship
information among these entities. Table 2 shows the information that needs to be captured about
users, organizations and devices during registration. Simple identities like username and
password can be used for authentication of users and organizations. An admin can perform
registration on behalf of an organization. Table 3 provides example registration data for users
and organizations. A unique entity ID is assigned to each user, organization or device that
registers with the IRM service. Note that the passwords are in clear text in the POC; in real
world, they will be protected by hashing, cryptographical salt and all other standard password
protection mechanisms.
Table 2. Registration Information for IRM
Entity

Information in IRM

User

Entity ID, username, password, email

Organization

Entity ID, username, password, email

IoT Device

Entity ID, owner Entity ID, private-public key pair
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Table 3. Example Registration Data for Users/Organizations
Registration

Sample Registration Data

Related Data
User’s registration {
information

"displayName":"Chris Matthews",
"email":"chris1@example.com",
"username":"chris1",
"password":"chris123"
}

Entity ID assigned usr. us-west.aae68cd7-a25f-4395-9373-9083feef1083
to user
Organization’s

{

registration

"displayName":"Swedish Hospital",

information

"email":"admin@swedish.com",
"username":"adminsd",
"password":"adminsd123"
}

Entity ID assigned org.us-west.61280c92-da46-11ea-add7-8ef44022b7e2
to organization
For devices, a public-private key pair can be used, where the private key can be
generated by and stored in the device and thus can only be known to the device; the device can
register the public key with the IRM service during registration process; the device can sign a
nonce provided by the IRM service using the private key and the IRM service can verify that
using the public key. Table 4 shows sample registration data for an IoT device.
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Table 4. Example Registration Data for IoT Devices
IoT device’s

{

registration

"name":"device1",

information

"ownerEID":"usr-6d922d2b-ffc8-4980-9bef-cb40a346a2ec",
"publicKey":"MIIBIzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCARA
AMIIBCwKCAQIAs8BEB3fBkWF+cKWaFPboY9uMa3vA
o1CE15DDavf4k5qGC1DSR52hwDQqXlsqov8GI4DuWhx+
UCu/uOU0hMcgzz+cUKgwHmGHWp7l6bqkvxbX3q91SR7
2mBR/4aLm4/65D8P5J7lfKdNkR7du7ttMfI++5obKQVTx9
1yCzkrPurvGi43jmSFcRuCmM48R0W7N/rgwaFJymU+bezl
UlruhLaTbGSn7H5G1tWcy1avRokIeoYdat2d2k+tfl1+mtAv
zw8l/9QMd6jeWTGU0CvwRBlDDaEHlN3QiyKLtDOWFck
SjB6chIsoT1oB9Clv2RqU2PcU6ft9gY2Gat3JSDCjrxJUCA
wEAAQ==",
"resourceScopes":"data-read,data-write,config-read,configwrite"
}

Entity ID assigned dev.us-west.f277ee92-d15c-4548-b0d5-615b43b74a05
to IoT device

5.4.4 Relationship Based Access Management
Once entities are registered with the IRM service, an IAM system can use IRM service
to get intelligence about relationships between the requestor and the device that is being
accessed by the requestor. Using that relationship information, the IAM service can evaluate
the relationship-based policies, which are defined by the device owner for controlling access to
the device when they register the device with the IAM system. In Figure 10, when a user or
another device (ERequestor, or ER in short) requests to access a device (ED), the associated policies
in IAM can check the Access Control List (ACL) to see if the requesting user or device has
been granted (i.e., whitelisted) or denied (i.e., blacklisted) access to the target device explicitly.
If the user or the device is not found in ACL, it can send a request to the IRM service to find if
the requestor has any relationship with the target device. If one or more relationships are found
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and if the relationships match with the relationship criteria specified in the policies, the policies
will grant only the accesses that are defined by the scopes in those policies.

Users/
Organizations

Register through
Certified Authority

Certification
Authorities

Certified
Relationship

Register
IRM Service
Registered Users and
Organizations
Registered Devices
Relationships

User
(ER)

Relationship Info

Organizational Boundary

Access

IAM

Device (ER)

Access

Policies
Policy X
ACL => If (ERequestor ∈ ACL OR
RelBAC =>
Relationship (ER, ED) = RelationshipY)
Then Allow Access

Access Control
Decision:
Allow = Y/N

IoT Device
(ED)

Figure 10. High Level Relationship Based Access Management in IRM
5.4.4.1 Relationship Calculation
According to 4.2.3 (8), the IRM service needs to handle six types of relationships:
R = {RUU, ROO, RDD, ROU, RUD, ROD}
The IRM service will take three relationship related parameters: (a) the entity ID of the
requestor (ER) that is trying to access the device, (b) the entity ID of the device (ED) that is
being accessed, and finally, (c) the degree of relationship (DR) which is the maximum distance
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between ED and ER in the relationship graph acceptable by the IAM policy in order to grant
access.
5.4.4.2 Relationship Graph and Searching for Relationships
For calculating ƒ (ER, ED, DR), the IRM service depends on the relationship graph as
described in Figure 5. The graph can be reorganized as shown in Figure 11 where the root of
the graph is the device (ED) that the requestor (ER) is trying to access. Each vertex in the graph
represents an entity and each edge represents a relationship between the entities/vertices it
connects.
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Figure 11. Relationship Graph
The IRM service applies Depth First Search (DFS) to travel the graph and search for the
requestor in the relationship graph, up to the level directed by the degree of relationship (DR)
parameter. If a path is found, that is captured in the result, and the search is continued for other
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possible paths. The final outcome includes all the relationship paths within the given degree of
relationship. Figure 12 shows the depth first graph traversal of the relationship graph, from topto-bottom and left-to-right order. The graphs may contain cycles, to avoid processing a node
more than once, each node is marked as visited or not visited. The graph has total 5 relationship
paths between node 1 (device ED) and node 11 (requestor ER):
{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-14, R14-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-17, R17-15, R15-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-12, R12-15, R15-11}}
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Figure 12. Depth First Search in Relationship Graph
Table 5 shows the output of the IRM based on the degree of relationship for the example
graph in Figure 12.
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Table 5. Relationship Results by IRM based on Degree of Relationship
Degree of

Output Relationships

Relationship
1

{}

2

{}

3

{{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11}}

4

{{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11}}

5

{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11}}

6

{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-12, R12-15, R15-11}}

7

{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-14, R14-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-12, R12-15, R15-11}}

8

{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-14, R14-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-17, R17-15, R15-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-12, R12-15, R15-11}}

9

{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-14, R14-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-17, R17-15, R15-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-12, R12-15, R15-11}}

10

{{R1-2, R2-4, R4-7, R7-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-14, R14-11},
{R1-2, R2-5, R5-8, R8-13, R13-16, R16-17, R17-15, R15-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-11},
{R1-2, R2-6, R6-12, R12-15, R15-11}}
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5.4.4.3 Algorithm to Find Relationships between two Entities
In the relationship graph, each entity is represented as a node and each relationship is
represented as an edge. Each node maintains a list of adjacent nodes that it has connectivity to
through some relationship and the relation information. Whenever a user, an organization or a
device is registered with the IRM service, a node gets created for the entity in the graph. When
a relationship is registered in the IRM service, the adjacent node list for both nodes involved in
the relationships are updated. Note that the entity and relationship information is captured in
database, and also in the in-memory relationship graph for faster access and computation. When
a relationship query is made, a depth-first search algorithm is used to find all the possible paths
between those two nodes by traversing the relationship graph data structure. The algorithm first
finds out the target entity node (the device that is being accessed) in the graph, marks it as the
root node, explores as far as possible along each branch until either the requestor entity is found
or degree of relationship (the maximum depth) condition is met, and then backtracks. The basic
idea is to start from the target node, mark the node as visited, move to the adjacent unvisited
node, and continue this loop until there is no unvisited adjacent node within the maximum
allowed depth directed by the degree of relationship. This way, the algorithm backtracks and
checks for other unvisited nodes and traverses them, until all the routes between the requestor
and device nodes and within the acceptable degree of relationship are captured. Table 6 shows
the DFS algorithm used for relationship calculation.
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Table 6. Pseudocode for Relationship Calculation
function findRelationships (targetEID, requestorEID, degreeOfRelationship)
begin
var entitiesInAllRelationshipPath, entitiesInCurrentRelationshiptPath;
if targetEID == requestorEID
return “self”;
targetEntity = relationshipGraph.findEntity(targetEID);
requestorEntity = relationshipGraph.findEntity(requestorEID);
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.add(targetEntity);
findRelationshipsDFSRecursive (targetEntity, requestorEntity, entitiesInAllRelationshipPath,
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath, degreeOfRelationship, 0);
foreach entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath in entitiesInAllRelationshipPath
for i = 1 to sizeof (entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath)
entity1 = entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath(i);
entity2 = entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath(i+1);
relationship = new relationship(entity1, entity2,
entity1.getRelationshipWith(entity2),
entity2.getRelationshipWith(entity1));
relationshipChain.add(relationship);
allRelationshipChains.add(relationshipChain);
return allRelationshipChains;
end
function findRelationshipsDFSRecursive (targetEntity, requestorEntity, entitiesInAllRelationshipPath,
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath, maxDegreeOfRelationship, currentDegreeOfRelationship)
begin
if currentDegreeOfRelationship <= maxDegreeOfRelationship
if targetEntity == requestorEntity
entitiesInAllRelationshipPath = entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath;
return;
foreach adjacentEntity in adjacentEntities
if entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.contains(adjacentEntity) == false
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.add(adjacentEntity);
findRelationshipsRecursive (targetEntity, requestorEntity,
entitiesInAllRelationshipPath,
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath, degreeOfRelationship, 0);
end
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5.4.4.4 Policy Execution in IAM
Figure 13 shows the detail access decision workflow used by IAM to make a policy
decision; here ER represents the requesting entity and ED represents the device that ER is trying
to access. It handles three aspects of access control: (a) explicit blacklisting, (b) explicit
whitelisting, and finally (c) relationship-based access evaluation. By default, nobody has access
to a device. Then IAM checks if the requestor is in an explicit blacklist; if ER is found in that
blacklist, IAM denies the access request and stops further processing of the policy. Otherwise,
the IAM checks if ER is explicitly whitelisted by looking at the ACL; if the requestor is found
in the ACL, IAM grants the access request and stops further processing of the policy. If the
requestor is not found in the ACL, IAM sends the requestor (ER) and the device (ED) entity ID
to IRM for checking if there is a relationship between these two entities. If IRM finds any
relationship, IAM evaluates if that relationship satisfies the relationship criteria specified in the
policy; if it does, access request is granted, otherwise the request is denied.
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Figure 13. Access Evaluation by IAM using IRM
For policy criteria evaluation, the IAM service will construct the relationship chain
between the requesting entity and the IoT device and compare the chain with the criteria defined
in the policy.
Below is a sample relationship criterion in a policy:
{
“accepted-relationships”: [“doctor”],
“max-degree-of-relationship”: “2”,
“minimum-certification”: [“Evergreen Hospital”, “Swedish Hospital”]
}
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Below is an example relationship inquiry request to IRM:
{
“degree-of-relationship”: “3”,
“requestor”: “user.us-west.1df5585b-da43-11ea-a4ce-f4b78e4022e2”,
“device”: “user.us-west.7e28e40b-da43-11ea-a4ce-f1df55854b22”,

}
Below is the example response from IRM for the above request:
{
“degree-of-relationship”: “2”,
“relationship”: [
{
“src-entity”: “user.us-west.7e28e40b-da43-11ea-a4ce-f1df55854b22”,
“tgt-entity”: “device.us-west.78340c92-da46-11ea-add7-4022f4b7e28e”,
“relationship”: “owner”,
“registration-date”: “05/02/2019”,
“certified-by”: {“Evergreen Hospital”, “org.us-west. 8ef44022-da46-11ea-add7-b761280c92e2”}
“certification-date”: “05/02/2019”
},
{
“src-entity”: “user.us-west.1df5585b-da43-11ea-a4ce-f4b78e4022e2”,
“tgt-entity”: “user.us-west.7e28e40b-da43-11ea-a4ce-f1df55854b22”,
“relationship”: “doctor”,
“registration-date”: “05/02/2019”,
“certified-by”: {“Evergreen Hospital”, “org.us-west. 8ef44022-da46-11ea-add7-b761280c92e2”}
“certification-date”: “05/02/2019”
}
]
}

5.4.4.5 Algorithm for Policy Evaluation and Access Control Decision
The IRM service returns all relationship paths between the IoT device and requestor in
an array of relationship chains where each chain is a linked list of relationships connecting the
device and the requestor. There can be multiple chains in the result as the entities can be
connected in multiple ways and all of them are returned in the result to the IAM service for the
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relationship inquiry. The IAM service iterates through all the relationship chains and checks
against the relationship criteria in the policy. At the beginning, all the requested scopes are
marked as “denied”. Whenever there is a match in the relationship criteria, the corresponding
scope is marked as “approved”. At the end of iterations, the IAM system returns the results
paired with the scopes to the device (or resource server) with the access privileges. The device
allows the requestor access only to the approved scopes (aka capabilities). Table 7 shows the
simplest form of access evaluation algorithm. In real world, this evaluation can be more
complicated based on the use cases.
Table 7. Pseudocode for Policy Evaluation and Access Grant
function checkAuthorizations (targetEID, requestorEID, requestedScopes)
begin
policies = policyRepository.getPolicies(targetEID)
if policies = null
reject;
return;
foreach policy in policies
degreeOfRelationship = policy.getMaxDegreeOfRelationship();
allRelationshipChains = IRMClient.findRelationships(
targetEID, requestorEID, degreeOfRelationship)
foreach relationshipChains in allRelationshipChains
foreach relationship in relationshipChains
if policy.eligibleRelationships contains relationship
foreach scope in requestedScopes
if policy.scopeGrants.contains(scope)
hashMap.add (scope, “approve”)
else
hashMap.add (scope, “deny”)
end

5.4.5 Protocol Choice for IRM
To keep relationship-based authorization loosely coupled and for the consumer-focused
use cases in the IoT space, we have chosen User Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 protocol for
access management of IoT devices using relationship. UMA grant is an extension of OAuth 2.0
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protocol, similar to the way the OpenID Connect protocol extended the OAuth 2.0 to introduce
authentication that was missing in OAuth 2.0. The UMA grant enhances OAuth capabilities in
the following ways:
a) Enables devices operating in different domains to communicate with an IAM server
operating in another domain that acts on behalf of a device owner.
b) Enables party-to-party authorization, that is, the resource owner authorizes access
to his/her protected resource for clients used by entities that are in a requesting party
role.
c) Enables a resource owner to configure an authorization server with authorization
grant rules (policy conditions) at will, rather than authorizing access token issuance
synchronously after authenticating. The authorization server and resource server
interact with the client and requesting party in a way that is asynchronous with
respect to resource owner interactions.
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Figure 14. OAuth 2.0 vs UMA 2.0
Figure 14 illustrates the difference between OAuth 2.0 and UMA 2.0. As shown in the
figure, OAuth 2.0 enables delegating access to a client to access some protected resource on
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behalf of the resource owner whereas UMA 2.0 enables delegating access to a third party to
access the protected resource. In addition, UMA 2.0 has a well-defined policy structure
maintained in the authorization server compared to OAuth 2.0. Therefore, UMA can meet all
the requirements of a protocol for relationship-based access control of IoT devices.
5.4.5.1 Components in IRM Flow
There are six components involved in our IRM flow: (1) IRM server, (2) authorization
or IAM server, (3) resource server or IoT device, (4) resource or device owner, (5) requesting
party and (6) requesting party’s client. Since the integration between IRM service and IAM
service is designed with this OAuth 2.0 / UMA 2.0 protocol, we used the OAuth 2.0 standard
terms. Figure 15 shows the six components in IRM and their role. Figure 16 explains the same
concept, except the IAM server is built in the IoT device.
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Figure 15. Access Management using UMA and IRM (External IAM Server)
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Figure 16. Access Management using UMA and IRM (Embedded IAM Module)
5.4.5.1.1 IRM Server
The IRM server represents the IRM service that manages relationships among entities.
5.4.5.1.2 Authorization Server
An authorization server, an OAuth2.0 terminology, is an IAM Server or an IAM
module, local to an organization or a device. The difference between IAM server and IAM
module is that IAM server is an independent IAM service running on its own infrastructure
whereas IAM module is an embedded IAM service in the IoT device. An organization may
operate a central IAM server for controlling the access management of IoT devices. Small
independent personal IoT devices may simply have an in-built IAM module in it.
5.4.5.1.3 Resource Server
A resource server, an OAuth 2.0 terminology, is an IoT device, which has some
resources or capabilities that are protected by the IAM service.
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5.4.5.1.4 Requesting Party’s Client
This is a client app or a simple UI on the IoT device that allows interacting with the IoT
device, the IAM service/module and the IRM service to access resources or capabilities offered
by the IoT device.

5.4.6 Protocol Flows
The following sections briefly shows some major flows for registration and
authorization with the IRM service.
5.4.6.1 User and Organization Registration
The very first step for a user or an organization to use the IRM framework is to register
with the IRM service. In this process, as illustrated in Figure 17, a user will use a mobile,
desktop or web-based client to register with the IRM service. The registration process can
involve traditional username-password based method. An email will help in resetting forgotten
password and two factor verification. The email can also be used as username due to its
uniqueness in representing the user. A unique entity ID will be assigned to the user.
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EID: Entity ID is a unique ID assigned to each user

Figure 17. User and Organization Registration with IRM Service
For organizations, an admin representative of the organization can register for the
organization. The admin can also register the organization-employee and organization-device
relationships on behalf of the organization.
5.4.6.2 User to User/Organization Relationship Registration
Another important factor in IRM framework is the relationship between two users. To
define this relationship, as shown in Figure 18, a user (i.e., user1) sends a relationship
registration request to the IRM services along with some unique information about the other
user (i.e. user2). The IRM service sends user2 notification about the request through some push
notification or email. Once user2 approves, the relationship is established and stored in IRM
service for future evaluation of policies and management of accesses using relationship.
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Figure 18. User to User/Organization Relationship Binding with IRM Service
5.4.6.3 IoT Registration aka User/Organization to IoT Relationship Binding
Figure 19 demonstrates the binding process of an IoT device with its owner or
administrator. In this process, the owner connects to the IoT device, and registers it with the
IRM service. The IRM service uses this relationship when granting other users access to this
IoT device, or when granting this IoT device to resources owned by the owner.
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Figure 19. User/Organization to IoT Relationship Binding in IRM Service
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5.4.6.4 Access Management to IoT using Relationship
Figure 20 shows all the registration processes needed in IRM framework using a data
flow diagram. Both the requesting party and the resource owner (i.e., device owner) need to
register with the IRM service. During registration, they establish a credential for authenticating
with IRM service and thus to prove who they are, an email address that they can use for resetting
or retrieving forgotten password and a unique entity ID to be used in the relationship graph and
relationship inquiry. The IAM service (or module) also needs to register with the IRM service
to establish a client id/secret that it can use for authenticating with the IRM service and make
relationship inquiry. The device registration happens using the public key of the device and a
unique entity ID is assigned to the device as well. For authentication, the private key of the
device is used to sign a challenge given by the IRM service.
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Figure 20. Registration with IRM Service
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Figure 21 shows the end-to-end authorization flow in the IRM framework. user requests
access to an IoT device, the device redirects the user to the IAM service, the IAM service
redirects the user to the IRM service, user authenticates with the IRM service and the entity ID
of the user is returned to the IAM service. Now that the IAM service has entity ID of both the
user and the device, it sends a relationship inquiry to the IRM service with those entity IDs. The
IRM service computes the relationship and returns the results to the IAM service, the IAM
service uses these relationships to compute the user’s access based on the policies defined for
the device and redirects the user to the device with the result, and finally the device allows the
user access to the requested capability if the result is positive.
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Figure 21. Access Management to IoT using IRM Service
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5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have described the proposed design for implementing IRM and
relationship-based access control and integrating this with traditional IAM systems. We have
chosen UMA 2.0 protocol to grant users access to IoT devices based on relationships, because
UMA enables devices operating in different domains to communicate with an IAM server
operating in another domain that acts on behalf of a device owner and enables party-to-party
authorization through relationship-based policies. Here is a summary of the entire process:
a) The device owner, the device, the requesting party, the IAM server – all register
with the IRM service.
b) The device owner puts his IoT Device (aka capabilities) and its available scopes
under IAM server’s (or IAM module’s) protection by registering the device with the
IAM service. The IAM server registers the device with IRM service as well in this
process. Once registered, the device owner sets relationship-based policy conditions
at the IAM server.
c) Client acting on behalf of the requesting party makes an access request to the
protected IoT device (with invalid/no RPT access token).
d) The device requests permissions (resources and scopes bound to that device).
e) The IAM server returns a permission ticket.
f) The device returns IAM server URI and permission ticket.
g) The client requests access token from the IAM server by providing the permission
ticket and any required claims.
h) The IAM server sends a relationship inquiry to the IRM server for any relationships
between the requesting party and the device.
i) The IRM server returns the relationships results.
j) The IAM servers performs authorization assessment based on relationship-policies
and issues an RPT.
k) The client requests to the IoT device for the protected resource with RPT.
l) The device introspects RPT at the IAM server.
m) The IAM server returns token introspection status.
n) The device gives access to the protected resource.
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CHAPTER 6
IRM ARCHITECTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE
One of the key objectives of the IRM system is to provide a borderless architecture
overcoming the limitations of the traditional IAM systems which are limited in managing
employees of a single or a set of federated organizations within a defined perimeter through
static intelligence. Therefore, the IRM system needs to be built with the following two
attributes: (a) it needs to be accessible from anywhere and support geographically distributed
customer base with low latency; (b) it needs to be able to identify and authenticate any users.
This chapter discusses how these two attributes can be addressed in the architecture design of
the IRM service.

6.1 Distributed Multi-Provider Multi-Region Modular Design
Figure 22 illustrates a geographically distributed architecture of the IRM framework.
Providing IRM services globally requires a multi-region and a multi-provider architecture,
similar to the model used by the Internet where each Internet Service Provider (ISP) manages
and provides Internet services to their subscribers. Each provider maintains and manages IRM
service in a given geographical region. The IRM services are distributed across multiple
availability zones in a single region to support business continuity and disaster recovery. Users
or devices connect to the IRM service in their nearest zone. The application tier reads data from
the cache from the same zone. The cache stores two types of data: first, all the data from the
current provider, and second, any data fetched from other providers or regions to support
roaming users and devices from other regions. Providers have trust relationship with each other
and works together to deliver a seamless experience to customers.

62

Users /
IAM

Users /
IAM

Users /
IAM

Web Apps

Web Apps

Web Apps

Cache

Cache

Cache

Databases

Databases

Databases

Provider X

Provider Y

Provider Z

Figure 22. Distributed Architecture of IRM System

6.2 Scalable Multi-Tier Design
Figure 23 shows a large-scale architecture for an IRM service. The components include
load balancers, web servers, relationship graph service, APIs, messaging queue, in-memory
cache, and databases.
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Figure 23. Multi-tier Design of IRM System
Requests from user, organization and device registration and authentication,
relationship registration, IAM relationship inquiries, and administration activities are routed to
the nearest IRM service endpoint. The load balancers route the requests to a web server. Write
requests such as account registration, deletion and maintenance are directly inserted into the
master database. Write requests such as relationship registration go through async write process
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and thus put in a queue for inserting into the write database. Read requests, for example,
authentication, relationship query, etc. are served from the in-memory cache. A write-through
model is used and thus the cache is updated immediately when the read replicas are updated.
This is for higher throughput since in the cache-aside model, the cache is updated after the data
is requested, and thus can take longer time to fulfill the request. IRM services from other regions
also performs read from the cache via the read APIs. For further performance improvement, the
databases can be sharded based on entity types and the first alphabet of the entity name. Figure
24 shows username based sharding of databases. Database sharding is a horizontal partitioning
process where data are distributed across separate database nodes to improve performance. For
IRM, sharding by username will help with faster authentication, device and relationship
maintenance work by a user or an organization.
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Figure 24. Database Sharding in IRM

6.3 Pluggable with Existing IAM Frameworks
The User Managed Access 2.0 protocol has been chosen for IRM framework to allows
IAM systems integrate with IRM system via an IRM plug-in. We have not made any
fundamental changes in the UMA 2.0 flow to support IRM. The changes are only in the
authorization check module, where a call is made to the IRM service to find out the relationship
between the target and the requestor and in the decision-making module which performs the
relationship criteria evaluation. There is another change where IAM redirects the users to the
IRM service to authenticate and get the entity ID from the IRM service, these entity IDs are
used in relationship inquiry. All fundamental IAM concepts and processes remain unchanged.
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6.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed how IRM infrastructure can be geo-distributed to operate in a
global scale. The multi-provider architecture enables different providers to operate IRM service
in different regions independently and interact with each other to provide relationship insight
for roaming users and devices.
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CHAPTER 7
EVALUATION & TEST RESULTS
This chapter discusses the outcome of the IRM framework presented in chapters 4, 5,
and 6, and performs an in-depth evaluation of the artifact designed as part of this research. In
the evaluation process, we developed a proof-of-concept of the IRM service and an IAM service
capable of using IRM for access management, and then we performed some case studies and
assessed the effectiveness of the framework against existing IAM technologies.

7.1 Implementation of Proof-of-Concept
The IRM POC is a crucial part of this research that provides a platform to validate the
design of the proposed IRM framework, to verify that relationship-based access control can be
designed in real world, and to prove that IRM can help with the challenges observed in
traditional IAM technologies. The POC has been developed in Java. A key consideration for
choosing Java was to support cross-platform compatibility and availability of open-source IAM
products. This system POC has been implemented as a small-scale distributed web service and
it exposes REST APIs for interaction with users, organizations, devices and IAM services.
PostgreSQL has been used for database. Some major APIs for IRM in simplified form have
been listed below.

7.1.1 User Registration
Users register with the IRM service to take advantage of relationship-based access
control. In this process, a user creates an account with the IRM service and gets a unique entity
ID assigned to him. This enables the user to establish relationships with other users,
organizations, and devices in the IRM service, and this also provides the user an identity that is
trusted by different IAM services. In other words, the IRM service works here as an Identity
Provider (IdP) while the IAM service works as a Service Provider (SP). At the minimum, the
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user needs a username and password for authentication, and an email address for password
reset.
Sample Request:
POST /users/register HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9090
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
{
"displayName":"Chris Matthews",
"email":"chris1@example.com",
"username":"chris1",
"password":"chris123"
}

Response:
{
"entityId": "usr.us-west.33995dfd-e406-438b-96ba-05d5e374fb9a"
}

7.1.2 Organization Registration
Like users, organizations also register with the IRM service to take advantage of
relationship-based access control. An administrator or a representative creates an account with
the IRM service on behalf of the company and gets a unique entity ID assigned for the
organization. This enables the organization to establish relationships with other its members,
other users, organizations, and devices in the IRM service. Similar to the users, this gives the
organization an identity that is trusted by the IAM service. The organization account needs a
username and password for authentication, in other words, to prove its identity to the IAM
service, and an email address for password reset.
Sample Request:
POST /orgs/register HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9090
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
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{
"displayName":"Swedish Hospital",
"email":"admin@swedish.com",
"username":"adminsd",
"password":"adminsd123"
}

Response:
{
"entityId": "org.us-west.b5c44ca1-6a55-4e85-bc82-0e264f3b5903"
}

7.1.3 Device Registration
A device is always owned by a user or an organization and managed by either an
external IAM service under the organization, or by a mini IAM module built inside the device.
The device is registered with the IAM service, is associated with an owner (e.g., a user or an
organization), and managed by the IAM service based on some pre-defined policies. To take
advantage of the relationship-based access control, it needs to be registered with the IRM
service. The IRM service also needs to know the owner of the device for finding relationship
with other entities. Device registration with the IRM Service is a two-step process: in the first
step, the device’s public key is registered with the IRM service, and in the second step, the
proof of possession of the private key is verified. Note that the private-public key pairs
generated by the device and the private key never leaves the device. The device gets an entity
ID in the IRM service after both steps are completed successfully.
Sample Registration Initialization Request:
POST /resourceSet/initreg HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10080
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
{
"name":"device1",
"ownerEID":"usr.us-west.33995dfd-e406-438b-96ba-05d5e374fb9a",
"publicKey":"MIIBIzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCARAAMIIBCwKCAQIAs8BE
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B3fBkWF+cKWaFPboY9uMa3vAo1CE15DDavf4k5qGC1DSR52hwDQqXlsqov8GI
4DuWhx+UCu/uOU0hMcgzz+cUKgwHmGHWp7l6bqkvxbX3q91SR72mBR/4aLm4
/65D8P5J7lfKdNkR7du7ttMfI++5obKQVTx91yCzkrPurvGi43jmSFcRuCmM48R0
W7N/rgwaFJymU+bezlUlruhLaTbGSn7H5G1tWcy1avRokIeoYdat2d2k+tfl1+mtAvz
w8l/9QMd6jeWTGU0CvwRBlDDaEHlN3QiyKLtDOWFckSjB6chIsoT1oB9Clv2Rq
U2PcU6ft9gY2Gat3JSDCjrxJUCAwEAAQ==",
"resourceScopes":"data-read,data-write,config-read,config-write"
}

Response:
{
"resourceId": "1",
"challenge": "chlng-b3d0edfc-e92a-4856-b74e-7f4a84c9610f1612784220295"
}

Sample Registration Completion Request:
POST /resourceSet/finishreg HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10080
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
{
"resourceId": "1",
"challenge": "chlng-b3d0edfc-e92a-4856-b74e-7f4a84c9610f1612784220295",
"challengeResponse":"ZEnv3vyOfF7q3hfL8XdO4afzIrf5p+8iniu6XjqgT1glKHBmhOKRyLet
RQR5T4KD/yw1X/J+o6Km+4e1XQRyzZOFPvYrxnkYYo17g+G9LYWeI/HDhHKXNzw7x
R7IWt1/HdB/agO2C510gT5Z58GpxQKDDukwXbdueahvBjshdwQ4znCX/Y9GFoNLRcORF
GYQkbubxGnOXaneTCuz/W59rodwJ2ufNYnJYzQDN49n6veIjsFf0Lc6BIFDkBcJphxYcBv
wxHHXME6JmlEvZLOXEbQH9GRMUJ9t6evZYYRvmAsREuRrTZJzUgP4T88VADEHcY
ylMPq6lBEpCN7GeTn3Yds="
}

Response:
{
"resourceId": "1",
"entityId": "dev.us-west.0ed909d7-46cd-43b9-bc66-9563710de8a6"
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}

7.1.4 Relationship Registration
Relationships are bi-directional, and thus need to be established with the consent of both
sides. For example, a father and a son have father-son relationship, and both need to provide
consent in the IRM service for establishing that relationship. To establish a relationship, a user
can log in to the IRM service and register a relationship by providing the target entity’s email
address. The IRM service sends a push notification to the target user, and once the target user
provides consent by accepting the relationship request, the relationship is registered in the IRM
service permanently.
Sample Request:
POST /relationships/register HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9090
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
{
"entitySrc":"org.us-west.ad87aebe-73f9-4a5d-a0f5-fdedc0272c5d",
"entityTgt":"usr.us-west.806c170d-1498-41ac-b87e-842185e31330",
"relationTypeS2T":"Hospital",
"relationTypeT2S":"Physician Assistant"
}

Response:
{
"relationshipId": "1"
}

7.1.5 User Authentication
The POC uses simple username-password based authentication.
Sample Request:
POST /users/authenticate HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9090
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
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{
"username":"chris1",
"password":"chris123"
}

Response:
{
"entityId": "usr.us-west.f05e249e-8175-474b-b024-c72b90a0c031",
"sessionId": "869ec92c-bcd1-45fb-bb5f-2cf8e630ea7c"
}

7.1.6 Relationship Inquiry
When an entity attempts to access an IoT device, the entity is redirected to the IRM
service for authentication. Upon authentication with the IRM service, the entity gets redirected
to IAM service with its entity ID. The IAM service sends a relationship inquiry to the IRM
service with the entity IDs of the requestor and the device the requestor is trying to access to,
and the acceptable degree of relationship defined in the policy. The IRM service will look for
all possible connections between the requestor and target entities in the relationship graph
within the given degree of relationship and return them to the IAM service.
Sample Request:
POST /relationships/find HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9090
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
{
"entityIdSrc":"dev.us-west.0e095694-68f3-44ee-aa54-1ea57e289acc",
"entityIdTgt":"usr.us-west.5f502836-51d7-4227-9503-fabea99000d2",
"maxDegreeOfRelationship":"3"
}

Response:
[
[
{
"entitySrc": "dev.us-west.0e095694-68f3-44ee-aa54-1ea57e289acc",
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"entityTgt": "usr.us-west.7071d4d4-f871-43d7-9d7e-90b354e61aa0",
"relationTypeS2T": "OwnedBy",
"relationTypeT2S": "Owner"
},
{
"entitySrc": "usr.us-west.7071d4d4-f871-43d7-9d7e-90b354e61aa0",
"entityTgt": "org.us-west.60a22a75-f4c9-42fa-9800-ba8d20e457e2",
"relationTypeS2T": "Patient",
"relationTypeT2S": "Hospital"
},
{
"entitySrc": "org.us-west.60a22a75-f4c9-42fa-9800-ba8d20e457e2",
"entityTgt": "usr.us-west.5f502836-51d7-4227-9503-fabea99000d2",
"relationTypeS2T": "Hospital",
"relationTypeT2S": "Doctor"
}
]
]

7.1.7 Policy
Policies are set in the IAM server for devices by the device owners. Each device can
have one or more policies. Each policy has relationship criteria, maximum degree of
relationship, scopes that are granted access to when relationship criteria are met and an expiry
time (in seconds) that tells the IAM system how long the access is valid after the relationship
information is received from the IRM service.
Sample Request:
POST /policies/register HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10080
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
{
"resourceId":"1",
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"scopes":"contact-read,healthhistory-read,healthhistory-write,vitals-read,vitalswrite,medications-read,medications-write,primarycare-read",
"relationships":"doctor",
"degreeOfRelationship":"2",
“expiryTime” : “3600”
}

Response:
{
"policyId": "3"
}

7.1.8 Authorization Check
The authorization check is conducted in the IAM Service (or IAM module). The IAM
service uses the relationship result received from the IRM service based on the policies and
determines which requested permissions (scopes) the requestor can be granted and based on
that the IoT.
Sample Request:
GET /access/checkaccess?targetEntityId=dev.us-west.0e095694-68f3-44ee-aa541ea57e289acc&amp;actorEntityId=usr.us-west.5f502836-51d7-4227-9503fabea99000d2&amp;scopes=health-history-read,vitals-read,vitals-write,medicationsread,medications-write,config-read HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10080
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache

Response:
{
"targetEntityId": "dev.us-west.0e095694-68f3-44ee-aa54-1ea57e289acc",
"actorEntityId": "usr.us-west.5f502836-51d7-4227-9503-fabea99000d2"
"contact-read": "approve",
"medications-read": "approve",
"medications-write": "approve",
"vitals-write": "approve",
"vitals-read": "approve",
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"health-history-read": "approve",
"health-history-write": "approve",
"medications-write": "approve",
"config-read": "deny"
}

7.2 Use Case Studies
The validation of the effectiveness of IRM framework in solving access control
challenges in IoT space has been performed by executing a use case of a smart medical IoT
device on the PoC platform developed for IRM framework. The following few sections perform
an in-depth study of some use cases to understand the advantages of using IRM, validation of
some design decisions, and challenges with IRM framework.

7.2.1 Access Control using IRM
Jack is provided a wearable medical IoT device that monitors his vitals, contains
information about him (name, address, phone, and emergency contact), his health conditions
and vitals, health insurance, medications, primary physician’s contact, etc. The device support
relationship-based access control, and Jack registers it with the IRM service. The device has
four scopes aka permissions:
•

contact-read: allows to read device owner’s contact information (name, address,
phone), emergency contact and primary care physician’s contact from the device

•

contact-write: allows to write device owner’s contact information (name,
address, phone), emergency contact and primary care physician’s contact into
the device

•

insurance-read: allows to read device owner’s health insurance information from
the device

•

insurance-write: allows to write device owner’s health insurance information
into the device

•

healthhistory-read: allows to read device owner’s health history from the device
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•

healthhistory-write: allows to write device owner’s health history into the device

•

vitals-read: allows to read device owner’s vitals reading from the device

•

vitals-write: allows to write/update device owner’s vitals into the device

•

medications-read: allows to read device owner’s current medication list from the
device

•

medications-write: allows to write/update device owner’s current medication list
into the device

•

config-read: allows to read device’s configuration from the device

•

config-write: allows to write/update device’s configuration into the device

When setting up the device, Jack registers four policies in the device to control who can
access what information:
•

Owner of the device can have full access to the device: contact-read, contactwrite, insurance-read, insurance-write, healthhistory-read, healthhistory-write,
vitals-read, vitals-write, medications-read, medications-write, config-read,
config-write.

•

Owner’s wife, son, daughter can have access for everything but config-write.

•

A hospital will have all the accesses except contact-write, insurance-write,
config-read and config-write.

•

A doctor will have all the accesses except contact-write, insurance-read,
insurance-write, config-read and config-write.

All users and organizations are registered with IRM service. Figure 26 shows all the
relationships Jack has established in the IRM service. Policy #1 gives Jack full control to the
device. Policy #2 allows Pam (Jack’s wife) and Oliver (Jack’s son) to read data from or enter
data into the device and see the device’s configuration. Policy #3 allows Joe (Jack’s PCP) to
read/write vitals, medical history and see and change device configuration. Policy #4 allows the
hospital that Joe is associated with to charge the bills to the insurance company.
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Figure 26. Case Study 1: Initial Relationship Setup
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During a business travel, Jack gets sick and is admitted to Premier hospital, a place
where he never visited. During admission, Jack provides his consent to get admitted and treated,
and thus establishes a hospital-patient relationship with Premier hospital; the hospital, on behalf
of Jack, registers that relationship in IRM service. The hospital collects Jack’s contact
information, emergency contacts and insurance information by accessing Jack’s medical IoT
device = no manual account creation or access provision are needed, everything is instantaneous
and seamless. Jim, Mike, and Kim are doctors in Premier hospital and thus in a hospital-doctor
relationship with the hospital. Figure 27 shows the updated relationship state after the
admission.

Hospital
Doctor

Doctor
PA

Alexa

Joe
(PCP)

Hospital
Doctor

Swedish
Hospital

Hospital
Employee

Doctor
Patient

Hospital
Patient

Pam

Husband
Wife

Jack

Mother
Son

Oliver

Premier
Hospital

Hospital
Patient

Owner
OwnedBy

Device2

Kim

Hospital
Doctor
Hospital
Doctor

Mike

Jim

Owner
OwnedBy

myHealth
Device

Figure 27. Case Study 1: Changes in Relationship State
Jim (doctor) attempts to access Jack’s medical IoT device to check his health condition
and history before the treatment. The IAM module in the device checks with the IRM service
and finds out his doctor relationship with Jack. After the calculation of the relationship against
the policies, the following permissions (i.e., scopes) are evaluated for Jim by the IAM service:

78
{
"contact-read": "approve", "contact-write": "deny",
"vitals-read": "approve", "vitals-write": "approve",
"insurance-read": "deny", "insurance-write": "deny",
"primarycare-read": "approve", "primarycare-write": "deny",
"healthhistory-read": "approve", "healthhistory-write": "approve",
"medications-read": "approve", "medications-write": "approve",
"config-read": "deny", "config-write": "deny"
}
Mike and Kim, two other doctors from different departments visit Jack on the same day
and they are also able to connect to Jack’s device to collect and update the necessary
information.

7.2.2 Certification Authority & Trust
As described in Figure 28, it is possible to have an adversary register a fake hospital,
fake doctor, and fake relationships in the IRM system, and access Jake’s medical device to steal
any data stored in the device. Therefore, the IRM system needs Certification Authorities (see
section 4.3.6) that can certify entities registering IRM and relationships established by them.
The IAM services is in control for implementing the access evaluation logic and deciding how
to weigh certified vs uncertified relationships for policy decisions.
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Figure 28. Case Study 2: Need of Certification Authority in IRM

7.2.3 Challenges in Policy Evaluation
The IRM service returns all relationships (aka edges) connecting the requestor and the
device. For relationships where degree of relationship is greater than 2, the IAM module needs
to be able to properly evaluate the relationship chain to take proper policy decision. Let’s
assume Jack has a sister Camelia and Matt is her son. So, the relationship graph for Jack looks
like Figure 29:
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Figure 29. Case Study 3-1: Challenges in Policy Evaluation - Similarity
Now, if Matt tries to access Jack’s medical device, the IAM module will find Matt in a
son relationship via Camelia, which is very similar to Oliver’s son relationship with Jack via
Pam. The only way to correctly assess this relationship is to evaluate the relationship with
Camelia. That means, IAM module needs to understand the different between wife and sister
when evaluating the policy. Various types of relationships are registered in the IRM service by
different entities and those relationships are only meaningful to the entities registering them.
Jack’s device will get all the relationships within the given degree of relationship number, and
thus needs to be able to smartly “interpret” those relationships. Alternately, a direct relationship
between Jack and Oliver can be registered in the IRM service, the policy can have a lower
degree of relationship, for example 2 in this use case, so that only direct relationships are
returned by the IRM service.
In another example, as shown in Figure 30, the hospital may register the relationship
with its doctors as employer-employee so that it can provide all employees some access based
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on relationship-based policy. However, in that case, Jim will not be able to access the Jack’s
device as the policy relationship criteria is ‘doctor’.
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Figure 30. Case Study 3-2: Challenges in Policy Evaluation - Naming
Therefore, relationships registered with IRM service will need to be designed and
planned cautiously. One possible solution for this issue is to register multiple relationships
between two entities, as illustrated in Figure 31.
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Figure 31. Case Study 3-3: Challenges in Policy Evaluation – Possible Solution

7.3 Comparison between Traditional IAM and IRM
In order to do a proper comparison between IAM and IRM, we need to understand how
we can implement the same use case of the smart medical device with different IAM
technologies. The following sections perform the case study with different IAM methods:
1. A basic IAM System only
2. An IAM system that supports SAML
3. An IAM system that supports OAuth 2.0
4. An IAM system that supports UMA 2.0
5. An IAM system that supports IRM

7.3.1 Basic IAM
A basic IAM system is typically limited in automatic provisioning and deprovisioning
of identities and credentials to/from different systems; the goals are to reduce the manual
process overhead of onboarding users and resources to different systems and build a singlesign-on (SSO) scheme across the organization. Figure 32 shows the high-level process flow for
a basic IAM system. When a user or a resource comes to the scope of the IAM through some
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onboarding process, the IAM system provisions the user or the resource to the systems defined
in the flow. The onboarding process has some manual steps to validate the user before
provisioning. After the user is provisioned, the use can get access to a system with the approval
from the appropriate approvers. In this case, Jack’s device is managed by an IAM system, which
could be a local IAM for that device only, or an IAM managed by the health insurance or the
hospital where his primary physician works. Only after the hospital and the doctors have been
provisioned to the device through the IAM, Jack can grant necessary accesses, which will be
another manual process.
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Process

Manual
Authorization
Resource Server
/ IoT Device

Provision
Users

IAM

Register

Onboarding
Process

Access

Client

Requesting Party /
User Accessing
IoT Device
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Process

Figure 32. Case Study: Traditional IAM
So, the following tasks need to be performed for the hospital and the three doctors to
get access to Jack’s device to access the insurance information and access the medical data
respectively.
a) Users (the hospital and the doctors) register with the IAM system
associated with Jack’s device (manual). IAM system then provisions those
entities to the device.
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b) The device owner (Jack) provides authorizations.
c) Users (the hospital and the doctors) access the necessary data.
d) Device owner revokes the authorizations.
e) Users are deprovisioned (manual).
Total steps for access management would be (1 hospital + 3 doctors) x (task a
registration + task b access grant + task d access revocation + task e deprovision) = 4 entities x
4 tasks = 16 tasks. Task (a) will have a manual and lengthy onboarding process, will require
contacting the support desk of the IAM service (unless it is a local IAM module inside the
device), proving and validating the identity in some way, etc. It would not be practical for this
use case – the doctors will spend all their time in this process instead of seeing patients.
Therefore, this is not a practical approach to use a basic IAM in this use case. Table 8 captures
the advantages/disadvantages of this approach.
Table 8. Case Study: Traditional IAM
Quality Factor

Basic IAM

Trust

High

Federation of Organizations

Not Applicable

User Provisioning

Manual, Lengthy Process

Access Grant

Manual

Access Revocation

Manual

User Deprovisioning

Manual, Lengthy Process

Feasible for the Use Case

No

7.3.2 IAM with SAML
With SAML (Security Assertion Mark-up Language) based federation, the above use
case can be simplified, and the length of time can be shortened to a great extent, however, the
feasibility of the solution remains a critical challenge. SAML is designed for exchanging
security information and commonly used for federation, identity management and single signon (SSO). In our case, using SAML, the IAM system associated with the device can be federated
with the IAM system of the hospital. In this process, the hospital IAM system contains a
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directory service where users can authenticate, and thus works as an identity provider (IdP),
and the IAM system associated to the device works as a Service Provider (SP). Figure 33 shows
the high-level process flow for using an IAM system with SAML federation. Here, Jack, the
device owner, needs to pre-authorize the hospital and the three doctors individually to the data
they need in the IAM service (SP). When the hospital or a doctor attempts to access Jack’s
device, the device redirects the user to the SP for authentication. Since the SP does not find the
user in its domain, it redirects the user to the IdP. After authenticating with the IdP, the IdP
returns a SAML assertation to the SP with the given user’s identity. The IAM service (SP)
decides what permissions the user has to the device and the device allows the user access to that
dataset only.
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Figure 33. Case Study: IAM with SAML
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So, the following tasks need to be performed for the hospital and the three doctors to
get access to Jack’s device to access the insurance information and access the medical data
respectively.
a) The IoT IAM service (SP) is federated with the hospitals IAM service (IdP).
b) Device owner (Jack) defines authorization policy based on attributes or
roles.
c) Users (the hospital and the doctors) access the necessary data through the
SAML federation process.
Total steps for access management would be (step a federation) + (step b define
authorization policy for hospital) + (step b define authorization policy for doctors) = 3, which
is significantly lower than the number we saw for using a basic IAM only. Task (a) will have a
manual process, will require establishing federation between the hospital IAM system and
device IAM system. However, SAML federation is only preferred for organizations that are in
partnership and have trusted relationship. It is not a realistic expectation to establish SAML
federation with all the organizations in the world for the device IAM. Thus, it would not be
practical for our use case where Jack can go to any hospital, and therefore, this is not a feasible
approach to use IAM system with SAML federation to solve this use case. Table 9 captures the
advantages/disadvantages of this approach.
Table 9. Case Study: IAM with SAML
Quality Factor

IAM + SAML

Trust

High

Federation of Organizations

Manual, Predefined Process

User Provisioning

Automatic

Access Grant

Automatic

Access Revocation

Automatic

User Deprovisioning

Automatic

Feasible for the Use case

No
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7.3.3 IAM with OAuth 2.0
OAuth 2.0 is not the appropriate protocol for the use case we are studying - access
control of the medical IoT Device. OAuth 2.0 is an access delegation protocol that facilitates
third-party applications to access protected resources on behalf of the resource owner, which
means the instance of the third-party application/client is owned by the resource owner, for
example, a banking app on a smartphone accesses the account owner’s account information and
performs transactions on behalf of the account owner. Note that here the smartphone is owned
by the account owner and the instance of the app is used by the account owner only – no third
party is involved. Table 10 uses the same metrics used earlier for basic IAM and SAML to
measure the qualities for IAM with OAuth 2.0.
Table 10. Case Study: IAM with OAuth 2.0
IAM + OAuth 2.0
Trust

N/A

Federation of

N/A

Organizations
User Provisioning

N/A

Access Grant

N/A

Access Revocation

N/A

User Deprovisioning

N/A

Feasible for the Use case

No

7.3.4 IAM with UMA 2.0
UMA 2 is extended from OAuth2 to delegate access to third parties based on pre-defined
authorization policies maintained in the authorization server. Figure 34 shows the high-level
process flow for using an IAM system with UMA 2.0. When a user or a resource comes to the
scope of the IAM through some onboarding process, the IAM system provisions the user or the
resource to the systems defined in the flow. The onboarding process has some manual steps to
validate the user before provisioning. After the user is provisioned, Jack can grant necessary
accesses to the hospital or doctors, which will be another manual process.
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Figure 34. Case Study: IAM with UMA
So, the following tasks need to be performed for the hospital and the three doctors to
get access to Jack’s device to access the insurance information and access the medical data
respectively.
a) Users (the hospital and the doctors) register with the IAM system (manual).
IAM system provisions the users to the device.
b) Device owner (Jack) provides authorizations.
c) Users access the necessary data.
d) Device owner revokes the authorizations.
e) Users are deprovisioned (manual).
Total steps for access management would be (1 hospital + 3 doctors) x (task a
registration + task b access grant + task d access revocation + task e deprovision) = 4 entities x
4 tasks = 16 tasks. Task (a) will have a manual and lengthy onboarding process, and thus will

89
require contacting the support desk of the IAM service (unless it is a local IAM module inside
the device), proving and validating the identity in some way, etc. It would not be practical for
this use case – the doctors will spend all their time in this process instead of seeing patients.
Therefore, this is not a practical approach to use a basic IAM in this use case. Table 11 captures
the usability metrics of this approach.
Table 11. Case Study: IAM with UMA
Quality Factor

IAM + UMA

Trust

High

Federation of Organizations

Not Applicable

User Provisioning

Manual, Lengthy Process

Access Grant

Manual

Access Revocation

Manual

User Deprovisioning

Manual, Lengthy Process

Feasible for the Use Case

No

7.3.5 IAM with IRM
Due to the use of IRM, the hospital and the doctors visiting Jack are easily able to access
his device to collect the insurance and medical information. There is no need to provision those
users to the IAM service or provide them any permissions explicitly, Jack does not need to
know the doctors and he does not need to validate their identity. Those users will be
authenticated through the IRM service and will be in a relationship with the hospital, those
should be sufficient to prove their identity and the relationship required for the automatic
authorization process. Figure 35 shows the basic architecture and process flow for using IRM
with Jack’s medical IoT device.
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Figure 35. Case Study: IAM with IRM
So, the following tasks need to be performed for the hospital and the three doctors to
get access to Jack’s device to access the insurance information and access the medical data
respectively.
a) Device owner (Jack) registers relationship-based access policies.
b) Jack registers with the hospital and thus registers the hospital-patient
relationship with the IRM service (manual).
c) Hospital and doctors access the necessary data. Access is granted and
revoked automatically. No user provisioning or deprovisioning required.
Total steps for access management would be 1 time policy registration + 1 relationship
registration during admission to the hospital = 2 tasks. Tasks (a) is done the very first time Jack
receives the device. Table 12 summarizes the usability metrics for this approach.
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Table 12. Case Study: IAM with IRM
Quality Factor

IAM + IRM

Trust

Moderate

Federation of Organizations

Not Applicable,

User Provisioning

Not Applicable

Access Grant

Automatic

Access Revocation

Automatic

User Deprovisioning

Automatic

Feasible for the Use Case

Yes

7.3.6 Comparison Results
The comparison of traditional IAM, SAML, OAuth 2.0, UMA 2.0 and IRM frameworks
has been consolidated in Table 13. As we see, even though IRM does not provide a strong
identity/authentication as direct membership or membership through SAML provides, all other
manual processes are eliminated – no need for federations, no need for user
provisioning/deprovisioning, or manual access provision.
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Table 13. Traditional IAM Methodologies vs IRM
Quality Factor

Basic IAM

IAM +

IAM +

IAM +

IAM +

SAML

OAuth 2.0

UMA 2.0

IRM

Trust

High

High

N/A

High

Medium

Federation of

Not

Manual,

N/A

Not

Not

Organizations

Applicable

Predefined

Applicable

Applicable

Manual,

Not
Applicable

Process
User

Manual,

Automatic

N/A

Provisioning

Lengthy

Lengthy

Process

Process

Access Grant

Manual

Automatic

N/A

Manual

Automatic

Access

Manual

Automatic

N/A

Manual

Automatic

User

Manual,

Automatic

N/A

Manual,

Not

Deprovisioning

Lengthy

Lengthy

Applicable

Process

Process

Revocation

Feasible for the

No

No

No

No

Yes

Use Case

7.4 Performance and Scalability
While this is not the focus of this research, a high-level design of the IRM service has
been provided in chapter 6. This design allows the IRM service to operate in a global scale via
a modular multi-provider architecture. In addition, replacing all IAM systems with IRM and
building a single system to control all devices would be impossible – that is why the design
separates the IRM framework from IAM frameworks and enable them to interact with each
other using the UMA 2.0 grant of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. Finally, the resources in IRM service
can be horizontally increased to ensure high service availability and redundancy.
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7.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed a basic implementation of the IRM service and major
APIs. This implementation has helped us to validate the design decisions behind IRM and
enabled us to verify a few use cases around access control in IoTs. We examined a real-life use
case of a personal medical IoT device being shared with doctors and family members using the
IRM framework. That gives us an understanding how IRM can be useful in consumer space for
managing access to IoTs. The use cases established the need of certification authorities. The
case study also revealed challenges in policy evaluation, which requires careful planning and
orchestration of policy evaluation logics.
Basically, the comparison shows three quality factors that differentiates IRM from
traditional or existing IAM methodologies:
(a) Provisioning and Deprovisioning: Due to the use of IRM for authenticating the
hospital and the doctors, their identity is interoperable with Jack’s device. So, there is no need
for federation between organizations, nor there is a need of user provisioning or deprovisioning;
this is a strong persuader for IRM. This makes the authorization to take place in a perimeter
less way. Due to the lack of IRM, this flexibility was apparently lacking in other approaches.
(b) Automatic Authorization: Since IRM is providing the intelligence about the
relationship to the IAM service, the IAM service is able to take the access control decision
automatically using the pre-defined policies. With traditional IAM, Jack would have to
manually provide accesses to all of the entities. There is always a bigger chance of mistakes for
manual processes.
(c) Real World Feasibility: Establishing Federation is a heavy weight process, only done
between two organizations under trusted relationship - it is not possible to have federation with
all the organizations involved in IoT. IRM removes that dependency – organizations only need
to use IRM service.

94

CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
The shift from IAM to IRM is yet to evolve. While both terms, IAM and IRM, are used
widely for identity and access management and interchangeable sometimes, IRM has clear
design objectives to achieve:
•

Identity of Things, not identities of human only: IRM aims to manage Identities
of Things which includes both identities of users and identities of devices.

•

Internet-scale, not enterprise-scale: IRM aims to address identity and access
management in Internet-scale, not enterprises-scale.

•

Borderless, not on-premises: IRM aims to support a user’s need of identity and
access management anywhere in the world. It is not limited to perimeter of an
enterprise.

•

Dynamic and contextual intelligence, not static and contextless intelligence:
IRM aims to adopt dynamic and contextual intelligence for access control, thus
mitigates security risks of data breaches.

Achieving these objectives differentiates an IRM system and a traditional IAM system.

8.1 Impact of the Artifact
This dissertation presents an IRM framework for the IoT. The artifact from this research
has provided the following outcomes:
•

Identified the characteristics of relationship for Identity Relationship Management
framework in IoT domain.

•

Demonstrated that access control can be performed using relationships.

•

Proved that relationship-based access control can be implemented in a borderless
way by slightly modifying the UMA 2.0 protocol.
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•

The borderless nature of IRM can provide dynamic intelligence about users and thus
can help in controlling access to devices in a perimeter less environment with no or
minimal process overhead.

•

The architecture of the IRM framework can be made modular and scalable to global
scale in order to manage billions of IoT devices.

•

The framework can coexist with traditional security methodologies like existing
IAM technologies, role-based access management, attribute-based access
management, multi-factor authentication, risk-based authentication, etc.

8.2 Limitations
While IRM has many potentials, it has some challenges and limitations that need to be
further researched. The following sections discuss a few of the challenges.

8.2.1 Formal Structure in Relationships & Complexity in Policy Evaluation
As discussed in section 7.2, relationships are often natural and context specific, and
therefore, it is difficult to come up with a common scheme to formalize relationships that works
for all use cases and is properly interpreted by all IAM modules during policy evaluation.

8.2.2 User Participation
The success of IRM depends on how effectively relationships are managed in the IRM
system. If relationships are not registered, or are not kept up to date, IRM can fail to provide
sufficient data for access control decision or can lead to improper access grants.

8.2.3 Security and Privacy
The IRM service will contain relationships about all users and organizations. This
information can be valuable for adversaries, therefore, if compromised, can become a big threat
to certain individuals. Unlike passwords, relationships cannot be changed – so the damage will
be long term and irreversible. On the other hand, with the proposed design, the IRM service
needs to return the relationships to the IAM services for policy evaluation and for deciding who
can access what.
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8.2.4 Standardization
Until IRM is not standardized by global standardization bodies, it will not be accepted.
For standardization, a lot more research needed on impact, security, and risk analysis. Also, the
business model around who will own and maintain the IRM services, how will the multiprovider model implemented globally – all these details need to be identified, planned, and
implemented.

8.2.5 Relationship in Authentication
There is a potential to use relationship and IRM in authentication, however, in this
research the focus was kept into authorization prospective only to facilitate access control
decision making process.

8.3 Contributions
This research has made contributions in two categories: research and practice.

8.3.1 Contributions to Research
This research has established the notion of relationship-based access control for IoT
devices and demonstrated how this can help overcoming boundary limitations and lack of
dynamic intelligence observed in traditional IAM solutions in IoT domain. The research also
identified what relationship characteristics are important for relationship-based access control,
how relationship-based access control can be implemented through an IRM framework, and
how the IRM framework can be built in a modular and globally scalable way. At the same time,
the research has helped in understanding the potential challenges and limitations with IRM
framework.
The Kantara initiative introduced the concept of Identity Relationship Management in
2013. However, it did not include any use case where IRM can be applied. A use case of using
IRM for access control in healthcare was demonstrated in this research. The evaluation results
further indicated the advantages of IRM service over existing IAM solutions. The identified use
case and the evaluation conducted in this dissertation are great contributions to the IRM
research.
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The research has led to one of the papers published in the 39th IEEE International
Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE) 2021 on Jan 10-12, 2021 (Nur & Wang, 2021).
Currently a very minimal amount of literature exists on IRM for IoT. This research and relevant
publications will build the foundation towards Identity Relationship Management for IoTs.

8.3.2 Contributions to Practice
Almost all organizations want to create their own IAM services and protect their users
and resources with strong perimeter. However, by doing so, these organizations introduce
process overhead and loss in business productivity. However, moving from organization owned
IAM to global IRM is a big change, and hence this is very difficult to execute in practice. The
research has provided a middle-ground solution where organizations and individuals still own
their existing IAM solutions and takes all the advantages of IRM and relationship-based access
control via the proposed IRM framework and modified UMA 2.0 based IRM plug-in. A lot of
manufacturers are building their own solutions for access control in IoT space. This research
will help them to rethink about the problems and in building robust solutions using relationship.
The proof-of-concept can be used as the baseline for building the next level of IRM platform.
Identity and access management is an essential fundamental component for any information
systems. Thus, this research provides and demonstrates a new way using relationships for
identity and access management in practice.

8.4 Future Directions
IRM is promising as the next generation identity and access management solution.
However, there are also many challenges to be resolved. Future research is desired in the
following areas:
•

Identity of Things and Lifecycle Management: IDoT includes both identities of
users and identities of devices. Identities of user can be based on “something a
user know”, “something a user is”, and “something a user has”. Identities of
devices can be based on “something a thing has”, not “something a thing know”
or “something a thing is”. However, schemes for uniquely identifying devices
need to be further studied. Due to the huge number of devices available, the
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scalability of the new schemes is essential. The POC has used asymmetric
cryptography for device identification. However, how can the keys be protected
in the device, how keys can be rotated, how that will impact device and
relationship registration in IRM – they need to be further studied.
•

Policy Evaluation with Higher Degree of Relationships: Most of the access
control use cases can be addressed with a low degree of relationships, for
example, use cases like device-to-owner, device-to-employer-to-employee,
device-to-owner-to-family, device-to-owner-hospital-doctor only have 1 or 2
degree of relationships, and these are easy to evaluate. However, policy
evaluation gets complicated with higher degree of relationships (or distant
relationships) – this needs further research.

•

Certificate Authority: Trusted relationship is the key to strong access control and
success of IRM. Integrity and trust can be achieved through certification
authorities attesting the relationships in IRM. There are a lot research
opportunities in digitalization of social and organizational relationships (for
example, birth certificate, marriage certificate, employment, etc.) and their
verification process.

•

Utilizing relationships for authentication and access control: Relationships
among users, devices, resources, and organizations can be used to describe the
dynamic intelligence that an IRM system looks for. The dynamic intelligence
can be embedded into the context when authentication and access control are
requested. However, there are still many problems to be studied about how to
characterize and define relationships and how relationships should be used for
authentication and access control.

•

Standardization and interoperability: Global standardization bodies need to
define the specification for a borderless IRM system to be adopted by the
communities. The system needs to be built in a modular and pluggable manner
without the need for a single organization to maintain its system globally. This
is why standardization of IRM protocols is important. This will really help
resolving the challenges when multiple information systems are adopted in an
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organization.
Resolving these challenging issues will help build an IRM system which targets to
identity of things, scales to the Internet, is borderless, and conducts authentication and access
control based on dynamic and contextual intelligence.

8.5 Summary
IoT will continue to connect people, devices, and data, and eliminate the perimeter of
business and personal space. Being identity in the core of security and privacy, it is crucial to
manage identity and access in the IoT in a robust, borderless, and modular manner. In enterprise,
the perimeters are well defined, users and resources are static. Therefore, IAM is appropriate
for enterprise use cases - for securing enterprise resources, enforcing regulations, and
automating processes. IRM, on the other hand, is more suitable for end user or consumer use
cases, where the user is not a direct member of the enterprise, rather a business or a consumer.
Here, the users are not bound to a perimeter, can be dynamic in nature (i.e., the relationships
are transient and context based).
IRM aims to resolve the limitations of traditional IAM system by supporting both
identities of users and identities of devices and utilizing relationships among users, devices,
resources, and organizations for authentication and access control. If IRM is able to achieve the
design objectives as described, it could be the essential core of any systems in the IoT. However,
there are also many challenges to be resolved in IRM such as the need of new scalable schemes
for Identity of Things, utilizing relationships for authentication and access control, developing
novel MFA methods for IoT, and standardization and interoperability issues.

100

REFERENCES
Anantharaman, P., Palani, K., Nicol, D. & Smith, S. W. (2016). I Am Joe's Fridge: Scalable
Identity in the Internet of Things. 2016 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things
(iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber,
Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData), 129-135.
IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/iThings-GreenCom-CPSCom-SmartData.2016.47
Bhattarai, S. & Wang, Y. (2018). End-to-End Trust and Security for Internet of Things
Applications. IEEE Computer, 51(4), 20–27. http://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2018.2141038
Baskerville, R., Baiyere, A., Gregor, S., Hevner, A., & Rossi, M. (2018). Design science
research contributions: Finding a balance between artifact and theory. Journal of the
Association for Information Systems, 19(5), 3. http://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00495
Birgisson, A., Politz, J. G., Erlingsson, U., Taly, A., Vrable, M., & Lentczner, M. (2014).
Macaroons: Cookies with contextual caveats for decentralized authorization in the cloud.
2014 NDSS Symposium, San Diego, California. Internet Society. https://www.ndsssymposium.org/ndss2014/programme/macaroons-cookies-contextual-caveatsdecentralized-authorization-cloud/
Chen, J., Liu, Y., & Chai, Y. (2015). An identity management framework for internet of things.
2015 IEEE 12th International Conference on e-Business Engineering, 360-364. IEEE.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICEBE.2015.67
Cirani, S., & Picone, M. (2015). Effective authorization for the web of things. Proceeding of
the 2015 IEEE 2nd World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT), 316-320. IEEE.
https://doi.org/10.1109/WF-IoT.2015.7389073
Da, B., Esnault, P. P., Hu, S., & Wang, C. (2018). Identity/identifier-enabled networks (IDEAS)
for Internet of Things (IoT). Proceeding of the 2018 IEEE 4th World Forum on Internet of
Things (WF-IoT), 412-415. IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/WF-IoT.2018.8355102
Maler, E., Machulak, M., Richer, J. and Hardjono T. (2019). User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0
Grant for OAuth 2.0 Authorization. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-maler-oauth-umagrant00.

101
Friese, I., Heuer, J., & Kong, N. (2014). Challenges from the Identities of Things: Introduction
of the Identities of Things discussion group within Kantara initiative. Proceeding of the
2014

IEEE

World

Forum

on

Internet

of

Things

(WF-IoT),

1-4.

IEEE.

https://doi.org/10.1109/WF-IoT.2014.6803106
Machulak, M., Richer, J. & Maler, E. (2018). User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 Grant for
OAuth 2.0 Authorization. https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/rec-oauth-uma-grant2.0.html
Maerz,

O.

(2013).

Identity

Relationship

Management,

Kantara

Initiative.

https://kantarainitiative.org/irmpillars/
Martin, F. (2002). Ssl certificates howto. The Linux Documentation Project LDP.
https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/SSL-Certificates-HOWTO/x405.html
Mordeno, A., & Russell, B. (2017). Identity and access management in the Internet of things–
summary guidance. Cloud Security Alliance, IoT Working Group.
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/assets/research/internet-of-things/identityand-access-management-for-the-iot.pdf
Mynzhasova, A., et al. (2017). Drivers, standards and platforms for the IoT: Towards a digital
VICINITY.

2017

Intelligent

Systems

Conference

(IntelliSys).

IEEE.

https://doi.org/10.1109/IntelliSys.2017.8324287
Ng, A. C. K. (2018). Contemporary Identity and Access Management Architectures: Emerging
Research and Opportunities. IGI Global.
Nur, M. & Wang, Y. (2021). An Overview of Identity Relationship Management in the Internet
of Things. 2021 39th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE).
IEEE.

https://www.icce.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-ICCE-Technical-

Program.pdf
Peffers, K., Tuunanen, T., Rothenberger, M. A., & Chatterjee, S. (2007). A Design Science
Research Methodology for Information Systems Research. Journal of Management
Information Systems, 24(3), 45-77.
Steinegger, R. H., Deckers, D., Giessler , P., and Abeck. S. (2016). Risk-Based Authenticator
for Web Applications. Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Pattern Languages
of Programs, 16, 1-11. ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3011784.3011800

102
Wilson, S., Moustafa, N., & Sitnikova, E. (2018). A digital identity stack to improve privacy in
the IoT. Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE 4th World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT),
25-29. IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/WF-IoT.2018.8355199
Wu, X., Steinfeld, R., Liu, J., & Rudolph, C. (2017). An implementation of access-control
protocol for IoT home scenario. Proceeding of the 2017 IEEE/ACIS 16th International
Conference

on

Computer

and

Information

Science

(ICIS),

31-37.

IEEE.

https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIS.2017.7959965
Wang, Y., Wei, J. and Vangury, K. (2014). Bring Your Own Device Security Issues and
Challenges. The 11th Annual IEEE Consumer Communications & Networking Conference.
Zhu, X., Badr, Y., Pacheco, J. & Hariri, S. (2017). Autonomic Identity Framework for the
Internet of Things. Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Cloud and
Autonomic Computing (ICCAC). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAC.2017.14

103

APPENDIX
Code Repository
The code for proof-of-concept has been checked in to GitHub:
IRM Service: https://github.com/mmnur/irm-service
IAM Service: https://github.com/mmnur/irm-iam-service
Utilities: https://github.com/mmnur/irm-pki-util
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Code Snippet for Finding Relationship
public List<List<Relationship>> findRelationships (
String entityID1,
String entityID2,
int maxDegreeOfRelationship)
{
List<List<Relationship>> allRelationshipPaths = new ArrayList<List<Relationship>>();
// If the entityID1 and entityID2 are the same, the requester and the target are the
// same. Therefore, the function will stop further processing and will return with a
// 'Self' relationship result.
if (entityID1.compareToIgnoreCase(entityID2) == 0) {
Relationship relationship = new Relationship(
entityID1,
entityID2,
"Self",
"Self");
List<Relationship> relationshipPath = new ArrayList<Relationship>();
relationshipPath.add(relationship);
allRelationshipPaths.add(relationshipPath);
return allRelationshipPaths;
}
// Locate the first entity in the relationship graph
Entity entity1 = this.findEntity(entityID1);
// Create data structure to capture the entities that have relationship path between entityID1
and entityID2
List<List<Entity>> entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths = new ArrayList<List<Entity>>();
List<Entity> entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath = new ArrayList<Entity>();
// Add the current node in the visited entities/nodes list
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.add(entity1);
// Check if there is any relationship between entityID1 and entityID2
entity1.findRelationship(
entityID2,
entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths,
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath,
maxDegreeOfRelationship,
0,
UUID.randomUUID());
// Connect the vertices with edges aka relationship information
for (int i=0; i< entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths.size(); i++) {
entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath = entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths.get(i);
List<Relationship> relationships = new ArrayList<Relationship>();
for (int j=0; j<entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.size()-1; j++) {
Entity e1 = entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.get(j);
Entity e2 = entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.get(j+1);
Relationship relationship = new Relationship(
e1.getEntityID(),
e2.getEntityID(),
e1.getRelationship(e2),
e2.getRelationship(e1));
relationships.add(relationship);

}
}

}
allRelationshipPaths.add(relationships);

return allRelationshipPaths;
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public class Entity
{
private String entityID;
private Map<Entity, String> adjacentEntities = new HashMap<>();
private List<UUID> visited = new ArrayList<UUID>();
............
............
............
public void findRelationship (
String entityID2,
List<List<Entity>> entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths,
List<Entity> entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath,
int maxDegreeOfRelationship,
int currentDegreeOfRelationship,
UUID visitedFlag)
{
if (currentDegreeOfRelationship <= maxDegreeOfRelationship) {
if(this.getEntityID().equalsIgnoreCase(entityID2)) {
entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths.add(entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath);
return;
}

}

}

}

for (Map.Entry<Entity, String> entry : this.adjacentEntities.entrySet()) {
Entity adjacentEntity = entry.getKey();
if (!entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath.contains(adjacentEntity)) {
List<Entity> currentPathExtension = copyList(entitiesInCurrentRelationshipPath);
currentPathExtension.add(adjacentEntity);
adjacentEntity.findRelationship(
entityID2,
entitiesInAllRelationshipPaths,
currentPathExtension,
maxDegreeOfRelationship,
currentDegreeOfRelationship+1,
visitedFlag);
}
}

